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The research examines how the banking sector in Zambia faired in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, and the ensuing global recession that followed. Even prior to the crisis, 
weaknesses within the Zambian Banking sector were already identified by a World Bank/IMF 
financial sector assessment. The research therefore aims to gain a better understanding of the 
potential destabilizing factors to the Zambia Banking sector, and provide key players 
(Policymakers, Regulators and Banks) with knowledge on how best to manage and overcome 
these adverse effects, in times of a financial crisis.  
 
A Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is estimated using commonly identified macro-
economic and banking sector indicators from selected Anglophonic African countries that were 
affected by the crisis at the time. The selected variables include, Return on Assets (ROA); Non-
Performing Loans (NPL); Foreign Assets (FA); Interbank Lending Rate (IBLR); Liquidity 
(LQD); Credit to Private Sector (PRV); Foreign Exchange Rate (FOREX); Inflation (INFL); 
Copper Price (CU); and a ‘dummy’ variable (CRISIS). The direction of causality between the 
variables is further established using the VAR Granger Causality Test. 
 
Results of the model suggests that although the CRISIS was found to cause the ROA, it had no 
significant effect on its outcome, implying that overall the crisis had very little effect on the 
Zambian banking sector’s profitability. It was the liquidity (LQD) variable instead which was 
found to have a significant effect on the ROA. 
 
In times of a financial crisis, it is therefore recommended that policy makers and regulators apply 
more stringent regulatory and monetary policy instruments. This would counter the adverse 
effects on the liquidity and profitability of the Banking sector, and thus ensure its stability. 
 
JEL Classification: G01; G21; G28 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction  
1.1 Research Background 
 
The onset of the global economic and financial crisis (2008-2009), which had its origins in the 
United States (US), following the sub-prime lending crisis of 2007, had far-reaching implications 
for most developing countries. In Africa especially, the low level of financial integration meant 
that most African economies were relatively shielded from the direct impact of the crisis. They 
only began to feel the effects in the second half of 2008 from the ensuing global recession  
(Louis, Leonece, & Taoufik, 2009). 
 
For the Zambian economy, the crisis happened at a time when the country’s economy was 
recovering and beginning to show signs of growth. This was following decades of grappling with 
macroeconomic imbalances, negative growth and declining per capita incomes (Mwega, 2009). 
Like most African countries, Zambia is endowed with natural resources, and therefore suffers 
from the commodity dependency syndrome, with Copper being its main source of exports.  In 
2008, Copper exports accounted for over 74% of total export earnings, which still is the case to 
date (Mwega, 2009). It is therefore not surprising that the secondary effects of the crisis were 
initially felt through the trade sector, as commodity prices of copper drastically fell, owing to the 
slow-down in the global economy. This further produced macroeconomic imbalances in the 
country that manifested itself in reduced revenue earnings from Copper exports; reductions in the 
availability of credit and trade finance; lower foreign capital inflows; and  loss of foreign 












The banking sector appeared to show more resilience in the wake of the crisis, despite several 
weaknesses having been highlighted in an earlier comprehensive survey assessment carried out 
under the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) in 2004(Ministry of Finance & 
National Planning, 2004). 
 
This research, therefore, aims at identifying the macro-economic and banking sector related 
factors, and their causality, which are most vulnerable to instability in times of an external crisis. 
Closer attention to these vulnerable factors would ensure a better response by regulatory and 
supervisory authorities in the sector and in Government. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
The Zambian banking sector has been undergoing a reform process following weaknesses 
identified within the sector even prior to the crisis (Fundanga, 2011). As already alluded to, in 
2004 the Zambian banking sector was characterized by low financial intermediation, with a large 
section of the population, having limited, or no access to affordable financial services. A few of 
these key weaknesses were highlighted in  the FSAP Survey carried out in 2004 (IMF/World 
Bank, 2003).Although the Central Bank had earlier taken a policy decision to implement Basel II 
at that time, its   implementation had been impeded by the absence of a risk management 
framework, and weak governance structures in the local banking sector (Ministry of Finance & 
National Planning, 2004).  
 
The dominance of the financial system by commercial banks had created a financial intermediary 
gap within the sector which excluded  a large section of the population and/or user groups, due to 
its costly and unaffordable banking services (Melzer, Agasi, & Botha, 2010). According to the 
findings of the FSAP, the sector’s high operational costs made the provision of low-cost and 
affordable services very difficult for most banks. In addition, the lack of a sufficiently developed 
financial market limited the alternatives for financial asset investments to mostly government 
bonds, which further hampered the market’s liquidity and efficiency (IMF/World  
 





Bank, 2003).Investments in these instruments, not only made the banks more vulnerable to 
adverse changes in the financial markets, but also had a crowding-out effect on private sector 
credit. 
 
Furthermore, the persistent fiscal deficits that characterized the economic environment at the 
time, and to date, has made the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy a challenge for the 
Government. This has created unanticipated shifts in money market liquidity, adding further to 
the already high banking costs in the sector (IMF/World Bank, 2003). 
 
According to Kalyalya, the above identified weaknesses in the Zambian banking sector has 
contributed to the dwindling role of the private sector in economic development. As stability of 
the banking sector is fundamental  if it is to play a facilitatory role in economic development, it 
is crucial that policymakers and regulators are equipped with relevant and objective information 
on potential destabilizing factors to the sector, in times of a financial crisis (Deputy Governor - 
Bank of Zambia, 2008). This would enable the implementation of better and more targeted 
regulatory and supervisory practices by the Central bank.  
 
1.3 Research Aims & Objectives 
 
Aims of the Research 
 
The research therefore aims to achieve the following: 
 
  i) Aim 1.  To identify Sub-Saharan African countries with similar foreign bank       
  ownership structures, to that of the Zambian structure.  
 
ii) Aim 2.  To identify the independent and dependent variables, within the identified 
countries, that were most affected by the crisis, and thus get a broader 
understanding of its impact on the banking sectors of selected African countries.  
 





  iii) Aim 3.  To estimate an appropriate econometric model to use in analyzing the 
relationships that exist between the identified variables, and to be able to get a 
deeper understanding of the performance of the Zambian banking sector, and its 
effect on the economy, before, during and after the crisis 
 
  iv) Aim 4.  To equip policy decision-makers, and regulators, with relevant tools to 
better understand the key factors that affect the performance of the Zambian 
banking sector in times of global external shocks. 
 
Objectives of the Research 
 
Having stated the aims of the research, the following are the related research objectives: 
 
  i) Objective 1: To review country-specific studies done on the impact of the crisis on 
Anglophonic banking sectors in selected Sub-Saharan African countries. 
  
  ii) Objective 2: To critically review studies done on selected Sub-Saharan African 
countries, and isolate the macroeconomic variables, and bank performance 
indicators, which were impacted by the crisis. 
 
iii) Objective 3: To estimate the appropriate Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model 
[unrestricted or restricted (Vector Error Correction Model - VECM)] and further 
establish the direction of the long and/or short-run causality among the variables, 
using the Granger Causality Test. 
 
 iv) Objective 4: To develop a framework that would aid policy decision-makers, and 
regulators, in addressing macroeconomic and bank performance challenges, in 
times of global external shocks. 
 
 





1.4 Significance of the Study 
 
It is widely recognized world-over, that one of the key impediments to economic growth is the 
state of the financial system. In Zambia, the dominance of the banking sector, therefore, makes 
the sector the key player within the country’s financial system (Deputy Governor - Bank of 
Zambia, 2008). 
 
The focus of the research will be on the Zambian banking sector, as opposed to the macro-
economy and financial system as a whole. This, therefore, adds a different dimension to the 
already existing knowledge on the wider subject area in Zambia, which has tended to focus on 
the macroeconomic effects of the crisis at a multi-sectoral level.   
 
The research will aim at gaining a better understanding of the key impediments within the 
Zambian banking sector. This will provide the banks with key information on how best to 
manage operations and, to the policymakers and regulators, how best to regulate and supervise 
the sector in times of a financial crisis. Further, a detailed understanding of some of the key 
challenges of the sector would enable the provision of more efficient and practical solutions that 
would better serve its clients/customers in the real economy. 
 
More specifically, the study will aim to answer the following key questions, and thus contribute 
to the existing studies that have been done on the subject: 
 
 i) Question 1: What effect did the foreign ownership structure of the banking sector have 
on the performance of the banking sector and the economy, before, during, and after 
the crisis? 
 
 ii) Question 2: Which macroeconomic variables and bank performance indicators were 
more sensitive to the effects of the crisis? 
 
 





 iii) Question 3: What are the causal relationships that exist between identified 
macroeconomic variables and bank performance indicators and how can they be 
objectively measured? 
 
 iv) Question 4: What framework would best aid policy decision makers and regulators in 
addressing macroeconomic and bank performance challenges, both in times of 
economic stability, and global external shocks? 
 
1.5 Rationale for the Study 
 
A few studies citing the impact of the crisis on the Zambian economy have previously been 
done. The rationale for this study, therefore, draws from the fact that there is a potential 
information gap that would provide answers to the aforementioned key questions regarding the 
banking sector in Zambia.  
 
Previous studies usually tended to focus more at the macro-economic level, by taking a multi-
sectorial and qualitative approach in understanding the effects of the crisis on the Zambian 
economy. Therefore, there was very little in-depth quantitative analysis of any single sector, 
especially the financial sector.  
 
In the two papers done by Manenga Ndulo, Dale Mudenda, Lutangu Ingombe and Lillian 
Muchimba for the Overseas Development Institute’s (ODI’s) “Global Financial Crisis 
Discussion Series”, the authors, only by way of graphs and tables, explored the impact of the 
crisis on trade, FDI, development assistance and remittances, which were the main transmission 
mechanisms. They also looked at government’s response and possible options. Prior and more 
detailed work, however, was done under the Financial Sector Development Programme (FSDP). 
The FSDP is a government document that was initially a 5-year plan (2004-2009), involving all 
key actors in the financial sector, that aimed at addressing identified structural weaknesses within 
the sector (Ministry of Finance & National Planning, 2004). Although the plan was  
 





commissioned prior to the crisis, it highlighted all the key challenges faced by the sector at the 
time, which are still prevalent to date. It has since been extended following its expiry in 2009.  
 
The approach to this study will however differ from previous studies in that it will focus solely 
on the banking sector and not on the overall financial system, or other specific economic sectors. 
Furthermore, it will adopt an econometric approach, using E-views Software, to estimate the 
appropriate Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model and determine the direction of the long and/or 
short-run causality among the variables, using the Granger Causality Test. 
 
1.6 Research Limitations 
 
The research had several limitations which should be borne in mind as the results of the analysis 
and conclusions are made. 
  
Firstly, it is limited to the period just prior, during, and after the financial crisis of 2008 (2004-
2014), and whose implications today are still having an impact on banking regulation and 
supervision, not only in Zambia but worldwide. 
 
Secondly, it adopts a more quantitative approach using the VAR Granger Causality econometric 
model to describe the causality of the selected variables. As the data could only be accessed 
through the Bank of Zambia (BoZ) website, it is mostly aggregated and therefore cannot be 
cross-checked with individual bank performance data within the sample. 
 
Finally, although variables from selected African countries were used as a basis for inclusion in 
the research, the research is limited to understanding the crisis and its impact on the Zambian 










1.7 Ethical Consideration  
 
The study will mainly be based on secondary sources of data and information, mostly from 
articles and publications on the internet, and therefore there are no major ethical considerations 
to take into account. The appropriate ethics documentation has since been signed, submitted, and 
approved for the same.  
  
 





1.8 Chapter Summary  
 
The global economic and financial crisis (2008-2009) had its origins in the United States 
following the sub-prime lending crisis of 2007. For the Zambian economy, this happened at a 
time when the country was recovering and beginning to show signs of growth, following decades 
of negative growth. Like most African countries, Zambia suffers from the commodity 
dependency syndrome, with Copper being its main source of exports.  Therefore it not surprising 
that the secondary effects of the crisis were initially felt through the trade sector as commodity 
prices of copper drastically fell, owing to the slow-down in the global economic growth. 
 
Even prior to the crisis, the dominance of commercial banks in the Zambian financial sector had 
created a financial intermediary gap which excluded a large section of the population and/or user 
groups, due to its costly and unaffordable banking services. This was highlighted in an 
IMF/World Bank Survey – Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) in 2004.  
Stability of the banking sector is therefore crucial if it is to play its facilitatory role in economic 
development, through its support to the private sector. 
 
The research therefore aims to gain a better understanding of the potential destabilizing factors to 
the sector, and provide key players (Policymakers, Regulators and Banks) with knowledge on 
how to best to manage and overcome these adverse effects in times of a financial crisis.  
 
A quantitative approach will be adopted using the appropriate Vector Auto Regression (VAR) 









CHAPTER 2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Global Overview of the Crisis 
 
The global financial crisis, and the ensuing global recession that gripped the world from the third 
quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009, had its origins in United States in 2007 (Baldwin, 
2009). Although many have argued that the writing was on the wall for many years prior to 
2007, it is generally accepted that it had a very profound effect, not only on the stability of the 
global financial system, but also on the policy regulation of banking systems globally.  Although 
banks globally were in the process of migrating to Basel III at the time, the effects of the global 
crisis accelerated the need for its immediate implementation. 
 
Ashamu & Abiola differentiates the 2008 crisis from previous crises of the emerging economies 
(Asia, Russia, and Mexico) by its trigger mechanism. In the case of these previous crises, they 
were mainly triggered  by the abrupt reversal of the large-scale capital flows these emerging 
economies had been receiving, and  accustomed to over the years  (Ashamu & Abiola, 2012).  
 
The 2008 crisis was characterized by a number of factors stemming from financial deregulation 
and unchecked speculative behavior of the major financial institutions ((Ntsosa, 2011). 
According to Ntsosa, in the United States, financial deregulation of 1993 removed the distinction 
between commercial banks, who tended to be more  risk averse, and investment banks, who were 
more risk tolerant and speculative.The unintended consequence of this was that institutions 
began to operate in “unfamiliar territory” when it came to developing innovative financial 
products (Ntsosa, 2011). Further, the combination of deregulation; high liquidityfrom the lack of 
investment opportunities in the financial markets; and low interest rates, following the burst of 
the dotcom bubble, encouraged financial innovation by the banks. With too much investment 
money chasing  
 





fewer investment opportunities, banks took on excessive risks which very often involved 
complex derivative instruments, creating a ‘moral hazard’. This was further compounded by the 
availability of credit insurance and implicit guarantees of Government bailout to  institutions 
deemed too big to fail (Mwega, 2009). 
 
The potential for higher returns in the housing market, presented an opportunity for investment 
banks to create complex mortage-backed securitieswhich, in a good number of cases, were triple-
A rated by the top rating agencies(Ntsosa, 2011). These  were then sold world-wide to 
individuals, hedge-funds, private equity and institutional investors. The borrowers of these 
mortages were mostly sub-prime borrowers and as the US government began to adopt a tighter 
monetary policy by increasing interest rates, default rates amongst these borrowers increased and 
housing prices fell. This led to downgrading of these mortaged-backed  bonds by the credit rating 
agencies (Ntsosa, 2011). Financial institutions that had guaranteed these assets suffered huge 
financial loses. As they  stopped extending funds to each other, this created a credit crunch which 
marked  the beginning of the global financial crisis (Ssewanyana et al., 2009). 
 
2.2 Theoretical Literature 
 
Role of the Banking Sector 
 
According to Sufian, the  banking sector is the backbone of most emerging and developing 
economies, and therefore its health is very critical to the health of the economy as a whole 
(Sufian & Habibullah, 2017). A knowledge of the factors that have an impact on the sector’s 
performance is therefore critical to better understand the relationship that exists between the well 
being of the sector and the growth of the economy (Levine, Ross, & Zervos, 1998). According to 
the modern theory of financial intermediation, the Banking Sector plays a critical role in liquidity 









The Diamond-Dybvig Model provides a framework that best describes this role. According to 
Diamond, banks make loans that cannot be sold quickly at a high price, and at the same time, 
issue demand deposits that allow depositors to withdraw at any time, thus creating a liquidity 
mismatch (Diamond, 2007). By accepting short-term liquid liabilities in the form of deposits and 
making longer-term loans which are illiquid, not only does the Banking sector directly affect the 
successful transfer of funds from savings to investment, but also play a fundamental role in 
facilitating investment and production, and thus contribute to the economic growth (Al-Khouri  
2012). On the other hand, this mismatch of liquidity, in which a bank’s liabilities are more liquid 
than its assets, makes the banks’ capital structure more fragile, and therefore more susceptible to 
illiquidity risk, further increasing the risk of a “bank run” (Diamond, 2007). 
 
Closely associated with this aspect of liquidity creation and transformation, is insolvency. When 
the value of the Banks’ assets (comprising of both short and long term loans to businesses and 
consumers) falls below it liabilities (comprising mainly of its short-term deposits) they become 
insolvent, due mainly to borrowers’ inability to service their debt. According to Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detragiache, the banks’ ability to manage both this default and credit risk is therefore critical 
in safe-guarding the banks’ assets, especially in times of a crisis (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 
1998). Should a significant proportion of banks within the banking system become insolvent, 
then a systemic crisis is said to occur. Theory therefore predicts that, shocks that adversely affect 
borrowers’ ability to service their debt, should be positively correlated with systemic banking 
crisis (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). 
 
Determinants of Bank Performance  
 
Relatively few studies have looked at bank performance in developing countries, more especially 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Sufian & Habibullah 2017) . A commonly used framework in Bank 
Supervision, and by scholars, to measure the stability and performance of the banking system, is 
the CAMEL (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Efficiency, Earnings  
 
 





Ability, and Liquidity) framework, which assigns a rating to each aspect of the Banking System 
(Sloan Swindle, 1995). A broad consensus of literature, however, further points to profitability 
and stability as the key indicators. According to Mirzaei, a profitable banking system would be 
in a better position to withstand any negative shocks and provide the necessary stability to the 
banking system as a whole (Mirzaei 2013).  
 
A study done by Guru et al, investigated the determinants of bank profitability in Malaysia. The 
results revealed that profitability was determined by both internal determinants (liquidity, capital 
adequacy, expenses management|), of which expenses management was most significant, and 
external determinants (ownership, size, economnic conditions), of which macro-economic 
indicators such as interest and inflation have a significant impact (Guru, Balachandher K., 
Staunton J., 2002). Subsequent empirical findings by Sufian however sugget that Malysian banks 
with higher credit risk and loan concentration exhibited lower profitability levels, in contrast to 
banks with higher capitalization, higher proportion of income from non-interest sources, and 
higher operational expenses, which tended to be more profitable (Sufian & Habibullah, 2017). 
 
A further study done by Demirguc-Kunt, on the impact of the level of financial development and 
bank profitability for a large number of developed and developing countries over the period 
1990-1997, found that higher bank development resulted in increased competition, and therefore 
lower bank performance. On the other hand, a lower level of financial development led to higher 
profitability and margins for banks, further suggesting complimentarity between the two (Asli 
Demirguc-Kunt and Harry Huizinga, 2000). 
 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, is another model that has traditionally 
been used to assess the performance of a banking system. The SCP postulates that market 
structure influences the conduct or behavior of the banks, through pricing and/or investment 
policies, which in turn influences performance. According to Mirzaei, an empirical study of 
6,540 banks from 49 emerging and advanced countries done over the period of the financial  
 
 





crisis 2007-2010 found that banks operating in more concentrated (less competitive) markets, 
although profitable and stable during normal periods, were less so during the crisis (Mirzaei 
2013). 
 
According to Spitt however, the key drivers of banks operational performance through the 
economic cycle are GDP growth and level of interest rates (Spitt 2010). In a dynamic economic 
environment, the increase in wealth arising from the increase in GDP allows banks to collect 
more deposits. On the other hand, a buoyant economic environment would increase the demand 
for loans and support for investment banking activities, with resulting lower levels of default 
among banks customers. This would increase net revenues, and given banks fixed cost structure, 
would positively affect banks margins and return on assets (ROA) (Reference & Fresard, 2011) 
 
Interest rates also play a significant role, according to Berger, as they determine the price at 
which banks have to pay to secure wholesale short-term funding. This has an impact on the 
Banks’ interest rate spread (difference between interest charged to loan customers and interest 
paid for customer deposits), which generates much of the banks’ revenue. (Berger, 2009). On the 
other hand, even in the absence of an increase in non-performing loans, banks return on assets 
may deteriorate due to an increase in short-term interest rates, which would easily be passed on 
to depositors, but not so for the long term bank borrowers (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 
1998). Berger further concludes that, a large increase in short-term interest rates may likely lead 
to systemic banking sector problems. 
 
With regards to inflation,  there is evidence that strongly suggests that there is a negative and 
nonlinear relationship between inflation, and banking sector lending activities (Boyd, Levine, & 
Smith, 2000). Rate of inflation plays an important role in determining short-term interest rates, 












Monetary Policy and the Banking Sector 
 
The response of Government to any crisis is critical, if the financial and banking systems are to 
remain stable. In this regard, monetary policy plays a crucial role in ensuring that the banking 
sector remains buoyant. According to the Federal Reserve, the monetary policy refers to the 
Central Bank’s actions in influencing the quantity, availability and cost of money, or credit in the 
economy (Federal Reserve. (n.d.). Federal Education Reserve.Org - Monetary Policy Basics).  
Currently in Zambia, the key transmission channels of monetary policy are the interest rate; 
exchange rate; and expectation channels (Bank of Zambia. (n.d.). Bank of Zambia - Monetary 
Policy). The schematic representation of this mechanism is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
Figure 1: Schematic Representation of Monetary Policy Transmission as at Present 
 









Figure 1 above clearly shows that monetary policy in Zambia, currently, anchors squarely on the 
policy rate. This being the reference rate for banks’ pricing of products and services, any changes 
in the policy rate, directly affects the key transmission channels mentioned, which ultimately 
affect the level of activity in the economy as a whole, and the banking sector’s ability to operate 
cost efficiently ( Bank of Zambia. (n.d.). Bank of Zambia - Monetary Policy). During the period 
of the crisis, the BoZ monetary policy framework was still anchored on a monetary aggregate 
measure of Broad Money (Bank of Zambia, 2009) to manage liquidity. It was only in 2012 that 
the current monetary policy regime was changed, by the introduction of the BoZ policy rate to 
influence the average interbank rate as a means to managing liquidity (Bank of Zambia, 2012).  
 
2.3 Empirical Literature 
 
The Crisis in Africa 
  
Within Africa, conventional wisdom would suggest that the impact of the crisis would be 
minimal, given its low level of financial integration with the more advance global financial 
markets (Africa Development Bank - AfDB, 2009).  With the exception of Nigeria and South 
Africa, the transmission mechanisms between the financial systems of most African countries 
and the rest of the world were considered weak at the time (Samuel, Maimbo, & Group, 2008).  
 
According to the AfDB, the African financial systems were dominated by the Banking sector, 
and at the time, the financial markets were relatively weak and in some cases non-existent 
(Africa Development Bank - AfDB, 2009). The World Bank, in its Access Finance Newsletter, 
argued that most African banks relied mostly on deposits and interbank lending to fund their loan 
portfolios. This therefore limited their exposure to the more risky, and often  toxic financial 
instruments such as derivatives, which are commonly used in the financial markets of the more 
developed economies.(Samuel et al., 2008). 
 
The slowdown in economic growth of most African countries during the latter part and ensuing 
period of the crisis, would however seriously question this conventional thinking.  Evidence  
 





suggests that the immediate and distinguishable effects of the crisis were felt on the two (2) key 
drivers of economic growth for most African economies namely: the primary commodity prices 
and its  demand, which were both driven by China’s strong economic growth; and capital flows 
of both foreign portfolio and direct investments  (FDI) (Africa Development Bank - AfDB, 
2009). 
 
Bank Ownership Structure 
 
Of further significance, is the role that the sector’s  foreign  ownership structure played which is 
still  prevalent in most African countries. A description of the ownership structure of banks in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, at the time, is given in the table below: 
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Source: (Honohan & Beck, 2007) 
 





From the above table it can clearly be seen that the potential for repatriation of funds, by these 
foreign banks, to theirs countries of origin was high, thereby putting African countries in a more 
vulnerable position (Osakwe, 2010). 
 
According to the World Bank, the presence of foreign banks may have mixed implications for 
the local banking sector. Whereas on one hand, it brings in a different level of competition, new 
skills and technology, and on the other hand, it might reduce access to credit especially to SMEs, 
as they tend to focus more on corporate clients (Honohan & Beck, 2007). Although evidence 
supports the former, it however does not seem to support the latter argument. 
 
Prior to the crisis, the new wave of entry of multinational banks in Africa, prompted mainly by 
the improvements in international communications on the continent, saw the re-emergence of 
former colonial and regional banks. These were mainly Anglophonic, Francophonic, and 
Portuguese banks (Honohan & Beck, 2007). The table below shows the multinational 
Anglophonic banks operating in the different  Anglophonic and Sub-Saharan African countries, 





















Table 2: International Anglophonic Banks and Branch/Subsidiary Locations in Africa 
Country 
Banks 
Absa (SA) Stanbic (SA) Barclays (UK) Stanchart (UK) Citi (USA) 
 
Angola      
Botswana      
Cameroon      
Côte d’Ivoire      
Congo DR      
Gambia      
Ghana      
Kenya      
Lesotho      
Madagascar      
Malawi      
Mauritius      
Mozambique      
Namibia      
Nigeria      
South Africa      
Swaziland      
Tanzania      
Uganda      
Zambia      
Zimbabwe      
Source: (Honohan & Beck, 2007) 
 
Effects on Selected African Countries 
 
The table above shows that 7 countries, namely Botswana; Ghana; Kenya;  Nigeria;  South 
Africa; Tanzania; and Uganda. had a comparable foreign ownership structure to the Zambian 
one. Although Zimbabwe may also have been comparable, there were serious structural 
economic issues happening in the economy at the time, which may have masked the true effects 
of the crisis. 
 
The effects of the crisis on these selected countries was further explored to get a better    
understanding of  the macro-economic and banking sector indicators that were adversely affected 
at the time. 
 
 





i) Botswana. An overview of the Botswana financial sector indicated that it had long been 
characterized by excess liquidity due in part to the accumulation of government budget surpluses 
in previous years (Jefferis & Tacheba, 2009). Credit to the public sector was virtually non-
existent, therefore government securities made up a very small percentage of commercial banks’ 
asset base. The strong liquidity position partly explains the sectors’ immunity to the international 
financial markets in the wake of the crisis.  
 
The fall in trade, FDI and remittances adversely affected the country’s current account and 
foreign reserves, hence putting pressure on the local currency exchange rate to other major 
currencies, and ultimately inflation (Ntsosa, 2011).  
 
According to the Banking Supervision Annual Report 2008, the sector remained resilient in the 
wake of the crisis as both deposit liabilities and assets, which remained predominantly domestic, 
grew to exceed the 2007 levels. This was on the back of a favorable macroeconomic and 
investment climate.  The non-mining corporate sector dominated corporate borrowing, which 
was consistent with the robust growth of the non-mining private sector GDP in 2009 (Bank of 
Botswana, 2009). Although the sector recorded healthy earnings in the same year, credit 
conditions were tightened, in anticipation of the global slow-down and fall in commodity prices 
on the domestic mining sector.  
 
NPLs grew at a much slower pace than the growth in loan portfolios, indicating an improvement 
in the asset quality. In 2009, however, the rate of profit growth for most banks declined 
significantly, as provisions for impaired loans rose sharply (Bank of Botswana, 2009). Capital 
adequacy was 2% above the prudential norm of 15%, with core capital continuing to command a 
dominant proportion of the bank capital. Notwithstanding these challenges, in 2009, the sector 
remained strong, with most banks reporting high levels of liquidity, and capital adequacy ratios 









ii) Ghana. The crisis occurred at the same time as the food and fuel price shocks in the 
region, and this coupled with the global economic slowdown, impacted negatively on the 
country’s current account, reducing it to very worrisome deficit levels (Ackah, Bortei-dorku, 
Aryeetey, & Aryeetey, 2009). Although commodity revenues for cocoa and gold the country’s 
main exports, improved towards the latter part of the crisis, these were offset by the high import 
bill d made up of oil and non-oil imports (Bank of Ghana, 2009). According to the Ghana 
Central Bank, this exerted pressure on the exchange rate, resulting in the depreciation of the 
currency. Given the high import content of non-food items in the consumer basket, a further 
result was an increase in inflation, which led the central bank to adopt a tighter monetary policy 
stance by raising interest rates (Bank of Ghana, 2008). 
 
The first round effects in the banking sector were minimal like most African countries. The 
sector was not exposed to the more complex financial instruments in the international capital 
markets and therefore relied mostly on low-cost domestic deposits for funding. Signs of 
contagion however began to show as the credit crunch began to take its toll on the economy 
(Ackah et al., 2009).  
 
According to the 2008 Annual Report, liquidity in the sector grew during 2008 due to the rapid 
growth of deposits, driven mainly by the strong growth in foreign deposits. This was on the back 
of the sharp depreciation of the currency (Bank of Ghana, 2008). Total assets increased funded 
mainly by the increased deposits, with loans and advances to private enterprises making up the  
bulk of the assets. Although total assets continued to increase in 2009, unlike in 2008 the growth 
was driven by domestic assets (Cobbinah & Okpalaobieri, 2014). 
 
As interest spreads decreased, banks’ profitability also declined. The banks remained solvent 
throughout 2008, with capital adequacy ratios all above the regulatory minimum of 10%. The 
average for the year was 13.8% (Bank of Ghana, 2008). Asset quality deteriorated marginally, as 
impaired assets increased due to substandard and doubtful loans. The resulting NPLs and loan 
loss provision further reduced the banks’ earnings. 
 





iii) Kenya. Like most African countries, the Kenyan banking system showed signs of 
resilience in the wake of the crisis, with all banks in the sector meeting the minimum capital-
adequacy ratio of 12%  through most parts of the crisis. As at November 2008, the sector’s  
adequacy ratio,  as measured by total capital to total risk weighted assets,  was  18.1%. 
(Nyangito, 2009). 
 
According to the Deputy Governor, the sector saw an increase in its asset-base in 2008, as 
deposits continued increasing. Profitability levels, as measured by the Return on Assets (ROA), 
increased whilst asset quality, as measured by the level of NPLs to assets, reduced. This could 
largely be attributable to the banks’ enhanced risk management and NPL recovery practices 
(Nyangito, 2009).  
 
Credit to the private sector dominated the asset portfolio of the commercial banks in Kenya 
which increased in nominal terms during the crisis period. Although loans and advances made up 
the bulk of the sectors’ assets, a minimum proportion of the portfolio was held as derivatives or 
asset-based securities, mainly as risk-free government securities (Mwega, 2009). 
 
In terms of macro effects, there was a widening of the current account deficit, due mainly to the 
reduced trade effects from tourism,which had suffered a major blow, and commodity exports 
(tea, horticulture and coffee). This coupled with the large import bill on food and oil greatly 
contributed to the deficit, increasing from US$1.1billion in 2007 to US$ 2.12 billion in 2008 
(Mwega, 2009). 
 
iv) Nigeria.  Although not well integrated into the global markets, the crisis had a serious 
destabilizing effect on the Nigerian capital markets in July 2008, as major international hedge 
funds withdrew and international credit-lines for FDI purposes faded (Ajakaiye & Fakiyesi, 
2009). According to a paper by Cobbinah & Okpalaobieri, about 90% of the assets in the 
financial system in Nigeria was dominated by the Banking sector, making it the key driver of the 
economy (Cobbinah & Okpalaobieri, 2014).  The widespread practice of ‘Margin Lending’ by  
 





banks’ to investors, particularly stock-brokers, for IPO and secondary market purchases of 
securities on the stock market had a further destabilizing effect, as the weak performance of the 
stock markets correspondingly affected  the overall quality of the sectors’ asset base (Ajakaiye & 
Fakiyesi, 2009). Although within acceptable limits, this was evidenced by the increased NPLs 
and bad debt provisions. 
 
In the wake of the crisis in 2008, the sector showed some resilience as assets increased by over 
47% (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2008) composed mainly of loans and advances. Although 
aggregate deposits increased during the same time, these were predominately demand deposits. 
While all other indicators remained within acceptable limits, credit in the economy began to dry 
up, as the global credit crunch wore on (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2008). According to the 
Central Bank, Interest rates became increasingly under pressure from the dwindling liquidity in 
the financial and inter-bank markets (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2008). To try and curb this, the 
Central Bank reduced certain regulatory requirements for the sector such as, the monetary policy 
rate; cash reserve requirement and the liquidity ratios. These pressures on the economy, 
therefore, allowed the freely floating exchange rate to depreciate during this period of the crisis. 
 
v) South Africa.   Prudent regulation and sound macro-economic policies at the time, 
shielded the South African banking sector from the primary effects of the crisis. Limited 
exposure to the more complex structured finance products, as well as capital controls pertaining 
to residents, further contributed to the insulation of the domestic financial system from the global 
financial markets (South African Reserve Bank, 2009b). 
 
According to the 2008 Supervision Annual Report, during the onset of the crisis, the banking 
system remained fairly stable. The total capital-adequacy ratio of 13% was above the minimum 
requirement of 9.5%, with the tier 1 capital adequacy ratio increasing from 8.9% to 10.2% during 
the period. The ratio further improved in 2009 to 14.1% (South African Reserve Bank, 2008). 
Banking assets grew by over 24%, with gross loans and advances making up the bulk of the 
assets. This reduced in 2009 amid the crisis (South African Reserve Bank, 2009a). 
 





Deposits represented the bulk of the sector’s liabilities, the main contributors being fixed 
and notice deposits (25%), call deposits (22.1%) and negotiable certificates of deposit (16.3%). 
In 2009 these deposits grew by 5.6%. Liquid assets exceeded the statutory minimum requirement 
and despite the turmoil surrounding the crisis, the sector profitability ratios were favourable. 
Credit risk ratios, expressed as a percentage of gross loans and advances, had deteriorated as 
impaired advances continued to rise due mainly to the increase in interest rates. 
 
In 2009 profitability levels were negatively impacted, mainly by an increase in credit losses and 
operating expenses. In the same year, liquid assets grew by 20% whilst credit risk ratios 
continued to deteriorate, exacerbated by the impact of negative annual growth in gross loans and 
advances (2009 Supervision Annual Report) 
 
Interbank market continued to function normally but with slight caution and a preference for 
shorter term funding. Credit criteria were tightened and a general decline in the rate of growth in 
all types of lending. Foreign banks’ exposures were mainly concentrated in the corporate sector, 
and as the crisis wore on, funding from their head offices dried up and local long term funding 
became scarcer, thereby increasing spreads on short-term funding (South African Reserve Bank, 
2009b).  
 
vi) Tanzania. Like most African countries, the country was able to wither the first-round 
effects of the crisis, due in part to its low levels of integration with international financial 
markets and, more importantly, it operated under a regime of capital account restrictions which 
significantly lowered the country’s exposure to toxic financial assets. However, by late 2008, as 
commodity prices began to lose value, trade financing within the banking sector became 











According to the financial indicators published by the Bank of Tanzania (Bank of Tanzania, 
2009) lending to the private sector grew by 26.6% during the year to September 2009. Other key 
indicators that performed favorably were the capital adequacy ratio; liquidity ratio; gross non-
performing loan (NPLs) ratio and the interbank cash market which continued to be liquid with 
stable interest rates. 
 
The low level of foreign assets in the commercial bank system (which stood at 11% of total 
assets at the time), as per the Bank and Financial Institutions Act (2006), was a manifestation of 
the banking sector’s low integration with international capital and financial markets. A further 
stabilizing factor was the country’s regulations regarding ‘foreign’ ownership within the 
sector.At the time, the country did not permit ‘foreign’ commercial banks to operate as branches 
of parent banks abroad, but as independent subsidiaries. Therefore any decision made by the 
parent banks abroad had little or no influence on the local subsidiary’s bank operations (H.B. 
Lunogelo, 2010). 
 
With regards to the macroeconomic indicators, the country’s foreign reserves had over 6 months 
import cover, held by the BOT and commercial banks. This was way above the internationally 
recommended 3-months. Despite this however, the country foreign exchange rate depreciated 
due to the increased demand resulting mainly from market speculation. Inflationary pressure 
emanated from the soaring world oil prices in the early period of the crisis. This was 
compounded by the food supply shocks resulting from poor rains in the first half of 2009. The  
resulting increase in food costs, strongly influenced the country’s headline inflation rate (Bank of 
Tanzania, 2009). 
 
vii) Uganda. Uganda, like most sub-Saharan African countries, suffered the second-round 
effects of the crisis which mostly included fluctuation in commodity and food prices. Within the 
Banking sector, banks’ balance sheets were at risk, as the level of NPLs threatened to increase. 
However according to the Bank of Uganda, in 2008 the sector showed signs of stability as 
indicated by i) the growth in total assets, which were mainly composed of loans and advances;  
 





government securities; and investments in foreign assets. ii) growth in total deposits, with 
demand and call deposits making up just over 56.7% of the deposits; iii) well capitalized in terms 
of Capital adequacy, with all banks meeting the statutory minimum requirements; iv) strong asset 
quality with the reduction in NPLs, thereby indicating strong risk management practices; v) 
growth in earnings; and vi) strong liquidity position as indicated by the growth in liquid assets to 
deposits ratio (Bank of Uganda, 2008) .  
 
At the same time, however, investments in government securities, declined significantly, as 
investors retreated to safer destinations like the US, which had seen a strengthening of the USD, 
and was able to offer more attractive US Treasury bill rates, stemming from the massive stimulus 
packages the US government was committing to the US economy.  
 
Tight global credit conditions lowered any expectations of external financing for FDI and 
borrowing needs purposes, thereby adding more pressure to the foreign exchange and domestic 
interest rates (Ssewanyana et al., 2009). Because of the anticipated high inflation, the Bank of 
Uganda therefore adopted a tight monetary policy stance that saw an increase in the interest rates 
(by 2% in January 2009) (Bank of Uganda, 2009). 
 
According to the 2009 Annual Supervision Report, stress-testing conducted on selected variables 
namely, net interest margin; NPLs, Interest Income on Government Securities; Depreciation of 
Uganda Shilling; and default by each bank’s largest borrower, revealed the potential for an 
adverse effect on the capital adequacy of the sector (Bank of Uganda, 2009). 
With regards to foreign ownership structure, the banking regulations required that all local 
foreign banks be licensed as subsidiaries, as opposed to branches, thus giving them more 











Summary of the Key Factors Affected by Crisis 
 
A summary of the key factors, that were affected by the crisis, within the selected countries 
described above, is given in the table below 
 


















































Banking Sector Factors (Internal 
Determinants) 
       
1. Call Deposits        
2. Capital Adequacy Ratios         
3. Cash Reserve Requirement;         
4. Demand Deposits         
5. Domestic Deposits,         
6. Earnings         
7. Fixed Deposits,         
8. Foreign Assets         
9. Foreign Deposits,        
10. Inter-Bank Lending Rates        
11. Interest Spread         
12. Liquidity Ratio,         
13. NPLs        
14. Private Sector Lending        
15. Public Sector Lending        
         
Macro-Economic Factors (External 
Determinants) 
       
1. Commodity Prices        
2. Current Account,         
3. Exchange Rate,         
4. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)        
5. GDP,         
4. Inflation,         
5. Policy Rate        










It is evident from the above table that certain factors were commonly affected in most of the 
selected countries, more especially the following: 
 
i) Banking Sector Factors: Earnings; Foreign Assets; Inter-Bank Lending Rates; 
Interest Spread; Liquidity Spread; NPLs; and Private Sector Lending  
 
ii) Macro-Economic Factors: Commodity Prices; Current Account; Exchange Rate; 
Inflation; and Policy Rate. 
 
The status of BASEL implementation gives an indication of the Banking sector’s regulatory and 
supervisory environment. This is given for the selected countries, both during and post the crisis 
periods, in the table below: 
 
Table 4: Level of BASEL Accords Implementation 
Country 
Status of BASEL Implementation1 
2008 (During Crisis) 2015 (Post Crisis) 
i) Botswana Post-implementation of  Basel  I Pre-Implementation of Basel  II 
ii) Ghana Implementation of  Basel  I Post-implementation of  Basel  I 
iii) Kenya Pre-implementation of Basel  II Implementation of  Basel  II 
iv) Nigeria Pre-implementation of Basel  II Implementation of Basel  II 
v) South Africa Post-implementation of Basel  II Pre-implementation of  Basel  III 
vi) Tanzania Pre-implementation of Basel  I Implementation of  Basel  I 
vii) Uganda Pre-implementation of Basel  II Implementation of  Basel  II 










                                                 
1 Surveys are carried periodically, by the Financial Stability Institute (FSI)  of the Bank for International 
Settlements, to access each country’s level of implementation of the Basel Accords (Financial Stability Institute, 
2015) 
 





2.4 Zambian Banking Sector and the Crisis  
 
In Zambia, government’s policy to pursue an open economy, since the 1990s, has made the 
banking sector potentially vulnerable to external shocks. Although the first-round effects of the 
crisis were not immediately or directly felt, the sector was one of the key mechanisms for 
transmission of the secondary effects.  
 
At the time, and like most African countries, the banking sector was dominated by foreign 
owned banks. The table below shows the ownership structure of the banking sector and 
percentage distribution of the assets during the time of the crisis: 
Table 5: Number of Commercial Banks and Distribution of the Banking Sector’s Assets 
Ownership 
2007 2008 2009 
No. Assets (%) No. Assets (%) No. Assets (%) 
- Foreign 8 62.8 8 63.8 10 65.8 
- Local 4 23.1 4 20.6 4 21.2 
- Partly Govt.  2 14.1 2 15.5 2 13.0 
Total 14 100 14 100 16 100 
Source: Bank of Zambia 
 
The table clearly shows the dominance of the foreign banks, both by size and number, within the 
Zambian banking sector. 
 
Regulation and supervision of the sector is carried out by the central bank, the Bank of Zambia 
(BoZ), which draws its mandate from both the Bank of Zambia (BoZ), and the Banking and 
Financial Services (BFS) Acts. At the time of the crisis, the sector was still implementing 
BASEL I, despite the BoZ having taken an earlier policy decision for all commercial banks to 











Prior to the crisis, financial intermediation in the sector was generally considered very weak as 
most banks held a significant proportion of their assets in government securities and foreign 
currency assets, which were mostly held outside the country. This reduced the funds available for  
lending to the private sector within Zambia.  
 
In 2004, in an effort to try and address some of these earlier impediments in the sector, the World 
Bank and the IMF undertook a comprehensive assessment of the country’s financial system, 
through the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP). The assessment found that in 
2003, the sector not only had one of the highest public sector credit to bank assets ratio, but also 
the lowest private sector credit to GDP ratio on the continent (Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning 2004). This speaks a lot about the structure of the sector, prior to the crisis, and its 
source of earnings, which were predominately from foreign exchange trading and interest on 
government securities. There was therefore, no incentive for banks to expand intermediation to 
the private sector.  
 
The plummeting commodity prices of Copper on the international markets had a serious impact 
on the country export revenues, which in turn had a destabilizing effect on the country’s   
economic fundamentals (Fundanga, 2009). As domestic inflation increased, so did interest rates, 
and this had a significant impact on lending, and credit availability. Corporate and household 
balance sheets began to deteriorate, and so did the banks’, with the increased levels of non-
performing loans (NPLs) (Fundanga, 2009). 
 
The contagion effects of the crisis on the foreign exchange markets led to a depreciation of the 
local kwacha currency. Foreign portfolio investors opted to liquidate their investments and 
externalize the foreign exchange, thereby reducing the available foreign exchange and adversely 
affecting the exchange rate. This further contributed to the rise in inflation, due to the country’s 









2.5 Chapter Summary  
 
Overview of the Crisis. According to literature, key among the factors that characterized the 2008 
financial crisis was the deregulation of the financial sector in the United States. Coupled with the 
high liquidity from the limited investment opportunities in the financial markets, and low interest 
rates following the burst of the dotcom bubble, this encouraged financial innovation and  
 
unchecked speculative behavior  by the banks. This was more prevelent in the housing market as 
investment banks created complex derivative instruments with a weak underlying asset base, 
predominately composed of sub-prime mortgage borrowers. Falling prices in the housing market 
led to increased default rates amongst these borrowers and the subsequent downgrading of the 
mortgaged backed bonds. This translated into huge financial losses for some of the big financial 
institutions and sparked the begining of the financial crisis, from the ensuing credit crunch. 
 
Determinants of Bank Performance.  A commonly used framework to access the performance of 
the banking system, is the CAMEL (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Efficiency, 
Earnings. Other studies done on Bank performance have revealed that profitability is determined 
by both internal determinants (liquidity, capital adequacy, expenses management|), of which 
expenses management was most significant, and external determinants (ownership, size, 
economnic conditions), of which macro-economic indicators such as interest and inflation have a 
significant impact.  
 
The Crisis in Africa and the Zambian Banking Sector. Evidence suggests that the immediate and 
distinguishable effects of the crisis were felt through commodity prices, which were both driven 
by China’s strong economic growth, and capital flows of both foreign portfolio and direct 
investments. It further suggests that it may also be attributed to the foreign ownership structure 
of the Banking sector, that is still prevalent in most African countries. The new wave of entry of 









Sub-Saharan Anglophonic countries, with similar foreign bank ownership structures to the 
Zambian one, were identified as Botswana; Ghana; Kenya; Nigeria; South Africa; Tanzania and 
Uganda. Factors that commonly affected these selected countries before, during, and after the 
crisis were categorized as Banking Sector Factors (Earnings; Foreign Assets; Inter-Bank 
Lending Rates; Interest Spread; Liquidity Spread; NPLs; and Private Sector Lending) and 
Macro-Economic Factors (Commodity Prices; Current Account; Exchange Rate; Inflation; and 
Policy Rate) 
 
With regards to the Zambian Banking Sector at the time, the main source of earnings for most 
banks was predominately from foreign exchange trading and interest on government securities. 
As foreign portfolio investors opted to liquidate their investments and externalize the foreign 
exchange, it resulted in the depreciation of the local kwacha currency. The high dependency on 
foreign imports gave rise to inflation, and subsequently high interests, which significantly 











CHAPTER 3  
Research Methodology 
3.1 Research Approach, Strategy and Design 
 
The research methodology will take a predominantly quantitative analysis approach. This will 
involve estimating the appropriate Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model [unrestricted or 
restricted (Vector Error Correction Model - VECM)] and further establishing the direction of the 
long and/or short-run causality using the VAR Granger Causality Test, among the identified 
variables in the literature review. 
 
Although not much has been written about the impact of the crisis on the Zambian banking 
sector, a lot of research and articles have been written about it on the continent and more so in 
other parts of the developed and emerging economies. Therefore the research approach will 
essentially involve the collection and reviewing of secondary data comprising mainly of journal 
articles, and publications done by credible bi/multilateral institutions such as the Africa 
Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Central 
Banks of selected African countries.   
 
The review will cover selected African countries with similar ownership banking structures to 
the Zambian one. This is to better isolate the effects of the crisis on those selected countries. The 
performance of identified macro-economic and banking sector indicators in each of the selected 
countries will be assessed during the periods before, during and after the crisis. These identified 
indicators will then be used to assess the effects of the crisis within the Zambia banking context. 
This is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
 




Table 6: Research Information Requirements & Tools   
Description 
Level 













- Effects on the continent and 
the transmission channels 
 
- Understanding of the  
ownership structure of the 
Banking sector at 
continental level 
 
- Segmentation of countries 
with similar Banking 




- Selection of countries with 
Anglophonic banking 
systems and similar foreign 
banking entities 
 
- Understanding the effects 
on the selected countries’ 
and selection of key macro-
economic and banking 
sector indicators/variables 
 
- Understanding of the  
transmission channels on 
the Zambian economy 
 
- Data on the selected 
macro-economic 
indicators/variables for 




- Description of the 
Zambian Banking and 
challenges faced prior to 
the crisis. 
 
- Data on the selected 
Banking sector 
indicators/variables for 
the 8-year period: 2005 -
2012 
 




Articles, Research Reports, 
Publications etc. 
 
Articles, Publications and 
Central Bank Reports etc. 
 
Articles, Publications and 
Central Bank Reports etc. 
 
Articles, Central Bank 
Reports and Econometric 
models: VAR Model and 
Granger Causality Test using 
EViews 
 





3.2 Variable Selection 
 
From the literature review, the key banking sector and macro-economic factors most commonly 
affected within the selected countries were consolidated to create the variables to be used in the 
models for data analysis. The following key factors were identified for consolidation: 
 
i) Banking Sector Factors (Internal): Earnings; Foreign Assets; Inter-Bank Lending 
Rates; Interest Spread; Liquidity; NPLs; and Private Sector Lending  
 
ii) Macro-Economic Factors (External): Commodity Prices; Current Account; 
Exchange Rate; Inflation; and Policy Rate. 
 
Monthly data will be used for the 8-year period 2005-2012, thus covering the period before, 
during and after the crisis. The table below gives the description of the selected variables: 
 





Table 7: Variable Definition and Sources 
Variable Abbreviation Description Type Source 
 
Banking Sector Variables (Internal Factors):     
1. Return on Assets – (Net  Income/Total 
Assets) 
ROA Measure of Earnings relative to its 
total assets. It reflects management’s 
ability to utilize the bank’s financial 













A measure of asset quality and is also 
used as a proxy for credit risk. Bad 
loans indicate inefficiency in lending 


















4. Interbank Lending Rate (%) IBLR 
 
Interest charged on short-term loans 
made between banks to manage 
liquidity and meet the statutory reserve 
requirements. The basis of the rate is 
the Policy Rate, and therefore has an 











Measure of the banks’ ability to fulfil 
its short term obligations, mainly to 
depositors. It’s also used as a proxy to 







6. Credit to Private Sector PRV An increase in credit extended to the 
private sector will lead to an increase 
in investment and therefore a growth in 













Table 7: Variable Definition and Sources (Cont.) 
Variable Abbreviation Description Type Source 
 
Macro-Economic Variables (External Factors):     
7. Foreign Exchange Rate  FOREX Measures exchange movements to 


















9. Copper Price: CU Commodity price of Copper, which 









10. Crisis (Dummy Variable)2 CRISIS “Dummy” variable that captures the 















                                                 
2 The dummy variable is a categorical variable that simulates the effects of the crisis by indicating a value of 1, corresponding to the “Presence of a CRISIS”, and 
0 corresponding to the “Absence of a CRISIS” 
 
 





3.3 Model Specification 
 
The estimated regression model will take the following form: 
 
yt = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡 𝑋𝑒𝑡  + 𝑒𝑡  
 
Where 𝑋𝑖 are the Internal Factors; 𝑋𝑒 are the External Factors; t refers to the time in months; yt 
is return on assets (ROA); and 𝑒𝑡 is the error term. 
 
Extending the equation to reflect the selected variables in the table, the baseline model is 
formulated as follows: 
 
ROAt = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑡 (𝑁𝑃𝐿 + 𝐹𝐴 + 𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑅    
                                     +𝐿𝑄𝐷 + 𝑃𝑅𝑉)𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡 (𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑋 
                                     +𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿 + 𝐶𝑈)𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡  
 
 
3.4 Analytical Framework and Tools 
 
The flowchart below gives an overview of how the data series of the identified variables will be 































3.4.1  Basis of the Econometric Model 
 
 
Hill tells us that in modeling relationships between variables, the nature of the data has an 
important bearing on the choice of econometric model to adopt. Unlike cross sectional data, 
which is collected at a specific point in time, time series data of a particular variable, is collected 
over a period of time, and therefore likely to be correlated. In addition, relationships between 
variables can be dynamic, as changes in a variable may have behavioral implications extending 
beyond the time period it occurred (R. Carter Hill, William E. Griffiths, 2007).  In modeling the 
dynamic nature of the time-series data, therefore, recognition should be given to both current and 
past values (referred to as ‘lags’). These lags may be via the independent variable, dependent 
variable and/or the error term. 
 
3.4.2  Autocorrelation 
 
Considering the standard regression model: 
 
yt = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑥1 + 𝑒𝑡  
  
According to Hill, unexpected shocks to the system are transmitted through the error term (𝑒𝑡 ) of 
the model. Therefore an error term in any one period will not only include the effects of the 
current shocks, but also the carryover from previous shocks, leading to the existence of 
autocorrelation in the error terms. These effects are captured in the error model below: 
 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝜌𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡  
 
where  𝜌𝑒𝑡−1 is the carry-over from the random error in the previous period and 𝑣𝑡 is the “new” 
shock such as the announcement of a new policy. The model is referred to as a first-order 









The existence of autocorrelation has an important bearing on the modeling of dynamic 
relationships and choice of estimation technique. It is therefore important to be able to test for 
autocorrelation prior to use of the data. Hill proposes two methods are commonly used namely: 
residual correlogram and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. 
 
According to Hill it follows that 𝑒𝑡  is uncorrelated when  𝜌 = 0. The residual correlogram 
therefore tests the hypothesis: 
 
𝐻0 : 𝜌 = 0 for no autocorrelation, and  
𝐻1 : 𝜌 ≠ 0 for autocorrelation. 
 
 
3.4.3  Stationarity and Cointegration 
 
The time series concepts of Stationarity and Cointegration are key in dynamic regression 
modeling and are further elaborated by Hill (R. Carter Hill, William E. Griffiths, 2007). 
 
Stationarity 
According to Hill, before embarking on a regression analysis it is important to ensure that the 
time series data is stationary to avoid getting misleading results from unrelated data, such as that 
obtained from a non-stationary data series.  
 
Although observation of the plotted time series data is usually the starting point, the more formal 
tests for stationarity are Unit Root Tests, the most popular one being the Dickey-Fuller test.    
 
Most economic time series variables follow a random or stochastic process whereby a single 
variable y, is related to past values of itself and current and past values of the error term 𝑣𝑡, with 
no explanatory variable. This may be considered an AR(1) process given by: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 
 





In the special case where 𝜌 = 1, the model becomes a non-stationary random walk process, 
dependent only on the previous year’s value and error/”shock” term as given by: 
  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 
  
The stochastic time series appears to wander about with real pattern, a characteristic of a non-
stationary series variable that may include or exclude a constant and/or a time trend, and may or 
may not need to be incorporated in the Dickey-Fuller test. 
 
It then follows that 𝑦𝑡 is non-stationary when 𝜌 = 1. The Dickey-Fuller test, also known as unit 
root tests for stationarity, therefore tests the hypothesis: 
 
𝐻0 : 𝜌 = 1 for non-stationarity, and 
𝐻1 : 𝜌 ≠ 1 for stationarity. 
 
Cointegration 
From the foregoing, it follows that non-stationary “stochastic” variables can be converted to 
stationary by taking the first difference. 
   
 ∆𝑦𝑡 =  𝑦𝑡 −  𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝑣𝑡 
 
𝑣𝑡 is stationary and therefore by taking the first difference  ∆𝑦𝑡, the stochastic variables become 
stationary, integrated of order 1 or I(1).  A linear combination of non-stationary I(1) variables 
will therefore also be expected to result in a non-stationary I(1) process. In the special case, 
where it results in a stationary I(0) process, cointegration will be said to exist, implying that the 










As the residuals 𝑒𝑡 cannot be observed in any linear combination of non-stationary I(1) variables, 
the test for cointegration would effectively be a test of stationarity of the residuals 𝑒𝑡 , based on 
the test equation: 
 
∆𝑒𝑡 =  𝛾𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 
 
where  ∆𝑒𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 −  𝑒𝑡−1.  It then follows that ∆𝑒𝑡 is non-stationary when 𝛾 = 1. The Dickey-
Fuller test therefore tests the hypothesis: 
 
𝐻0 : 𝛾 = 1 for non-stationarity, and therefore no cointegration; and  
𝐻1 : 𝛾 ≠ 1 for stationarity, and therefore cointegration 
 
An alternative, and more straight-forward, test for co-integration is the Johansen Cointegrating 
Test, which uses the Trace and/or Maximum Eigenvalue Statistics to test the hypothesis for 
cointegration, directly, among the variables.  
 
3.4.4  Vector Error Correction (VEC) and Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) Granger Causality 
Models 
 
The VAR model is the general framework that describes the dynamic interrelationship between 
stationary variables. For stationary I(0) variables, this is given by a system of equations: 
 
  𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽10 + 𝛽11 𝑦𝑡−1 +   𝛽12 𝑥𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑡
𝑦
               
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21 𝑦𝑡−1 +   𝛽22 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑥 
 
where each variable is a function of its own lag, and the lag of the other variable in the system. 










For nonstationary I(1) variables that are not cointegrated, the system of equations is given by: 
 
  ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽11∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽12 ∆𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡
∆𝑦
               
∆𝑥𝑡 = 𝛽21∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽22 ∆𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡
∆𝑥 
 
which are converted to stationary variable by first differencing (denoted by∆ ) 
 
In the special case where nonstationary I(1) variables are cointegrated, the VAR model may be 
modified to allow for the cointegrating relationship between the I(1) variables. Incorporating the 
cointegrating relationship to the VEC model, given by a system of equations: 
 
 ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼10 +  𝛼11(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 −  𝛽1𝑥𝑡−1 ) +  𝑣𝑡
𝑦
               
 ∆𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼20 +  𝛼21(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 −  𝛽1𝑥𝑡−1 ) + 𝑣𝑡
𝑥               
 
where 𝛼11 and 𝛼21 are the error correction coefficients which show how much, and at what 
speed, ∆𝑦𝑡 and ∆𝑥𝑡 respond to the cointegrating error 𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 −  𝛽1𝑥𝑡−1 . The cointegrated 
model, within the VEC model, therefore determines the speed of adjustment towards the long-
run equilibrium position (R. Carter Hill, William E. Griffiths, 2007). 
 
VAR Granger Causality 
 
According to Petersen, the Granger Causality test is a technique based on the linear regression 
modeling of stochastic processes. In contrast to the standard regression models that simply 
establishes an association between variables, the Granger Causality test goes further to establish 
the direction of the causality, whether uni- or bidirectional. This presents a powerful forecasting 
tool that enables past values of one time series variable to forecast future values of another time 









Given a bivariate linear autoregressive (VAR) model of two variables x and y (Granger, 1969): 
 
 
  𝑦𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=1 10
𝑦𝑡−1 +   ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑗=1 11
𝑥𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑡
𝑦
               
  𝑥𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=1 20




𝑥               
 




𝑥 are the uncorrelated “white noise”/residual error series.  
 
In conducting the test, selection of the number of lags is critical in reducing serial correlation 
between the error terms (Mark Petersen; Janine Mukkudem-Petersen, 2014). A test would 
therefore need to be done to ensure that the optimum number of lags (model order n), are 
selected. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1998), can be used to determine the 
appropriate model order. 
 
To ensure that the model is a Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE), it is critical to further 
test the statistical characteristics of the VAR model, by conducting residual tests for residual 
autocorrelation, normality and Heteroscedasticity.  
 
From the VAR model, the definition of causality therefore implies that 𝑥𝑡 causes  𝑦𝑡 provided 
that 𝛽11   is not zero, and similarly, 𝑦𝑡 causes 𝑥𝑡 , provided that 𝛽21   is not zero (Granger, 1969). 
For each equation in the VAR model, the Granger Causality will therefore use the F-Statistic to 
test the hypotheses that, for 𝑦𝑡: 
 
𝐻0 : 𝛽11 = 0, for no-causality from 𝑥𝑡 to  𝑦𝑡 
𝐻1 : 𝛽11 ≠ 0, for causality from 𝑥𝑡 to  𝑦𝑡 
And similarly for 𝑥𝑡: 
 
𝐻0 : 𝛽21 = 0, for no-causality from 𝑦𝑡 to  𝑥𝑡 
𝐻1 : 𝛽21 ≠ 0, for causality from 𝑦𝑡 to  𝑥𝑡 
 





3.5 Chapter Summary  
 
The research approach will essentially involve the collection and reviewing of secondary data 
from selected African countries with similar ownership banking structures to the Zambian one. 
This is to better isolate the effects of the crisis on those selected countries. The performance of 
commonly identified macro-economic and banking sector indicators in each of these selected 
countries will be used to assess the effects of the crisis within the Zambia banking context. 
Monthly data will be used for the 8-year period 2005-2012, thus covering the period before, 
during and after the crisis.    
 
The selected variables included the dependent variable - Return on Assets (ROA), and the 
independent variables - Non-Performing Loans (NPL); Foreign Assets (FA); Interbank Lending 
Rate (IBLR); Liquidity (LQD); Credit to Private Sector (PRV); Foreign Exchange Rate 
(FOREX); Inflation (INFL); and Copper Price (CU). In addition, a ‘dummy’ variable (CRISIS) 
was introduced in the analysis as a proxy for the crisis. 
 
The basis of the applied Econometric Model is the dynamic nature of the time-series data used, 
which recognizes the effects of both current and past values (referred to as ‘lags’) of the 
variables. Given a standard regression model (yt = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑥1 + 𝑒𝑡 ) any unexpected shocks, ie a 
crisis, to the system are transmitted through the error term (𝑒𝑡 ) of the model. 
 
The error term in any one period will not only include the effects of the current shocks, but also 
the carryover from previous shocks, leading to the existence of autocorrelation in the error 
terms, which have an important bearing on the modeling of dynamic relationships and choice of 
estimation technique. It is therefore important to be able to test for autocorrelation prior to use of 
the data. Two methods are commonly used namely: residual correlogram and Lagrange 










Prior to embarking on the regression analysis it is important to ensure that the time series data is 
stationary to avoid getting misleading results from unrelated data. The more formal tests for  
stationarity are Unit Root Tests, the most popular one being the Dickey-Fuller test. Variables 
exhibiting similar ‘stochastic’ trends will have a long-run association and cointegration will be 
said to exist. The test for co-integration is the Johansen Cointegrating Test. 
 
The Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model is the general framework that describes the dynamic 
interrelationship between stationary variables. Where there is cointegration, the VAR model may 
be modified to incorporate the cointegrating relationship to the Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
Model. The cointegrated model within the VEC model determines the speed of adjustment 
towards the long-run equilibrium position. 
 
In contrast to the standard regression models that simply establishes an association between 
variables the Granger Causality Test goes further to establish the direction of the causality, 
whether uni or bidirectional. This presents a powerful forecasting tool that enables past values of 
one time series variable to forecast future values of another time series variable. 
 
To assess the validity, and thus ensure that the model is a Best Linear Unbiased Estimator 
(BLUE), it is critical to further test the statistical characteristics of the VAR model, by 
conducting residual tests for Residual Autocorrelation (using the Serial Correlation LM Test), 








CHAPTER 4  
Results & Discussion  
4.1 Trend Analysis of Performance Variables 
  
The following figures shows the monthly trend of the selected variables over the 8-year period 
2005-2012, thus covering the period before (Jan 2005 – Jun 2008), during (Jul 2008 – Jun 2009) 
and after (Jul 2009 – Dec 2012) the crisis (full data sets used in the analyses are detailed in 
Appendix 2). 
 
4.1.1 Banking Sector Factors 
 
Figure 3: Banking Sector Variables 
 
















Earnings generally showed a downward trend 
from 7% in 2005 and dipping significantly to 
a low of 1.2% during the 2008-9, the period 
of the crisis. It recovered in 2010, and 
continued on its downward trend to end at 
3.5% at the end of 2012. 
 















The graph shows a general upward increase, 
from a low of 2.3% during 2005 and 
increasing sharply to a high of 6.3% during, 
and just post, the crisis period. It then fell 
steadily during the period 2011-12 to end at 










Figure 3: Banking Sector Variables (Cont.) 
 
 

















Investment in foreign assets sharply fell from 
20% in 2005 to 10% in 2006, before increasing to 
18% at the beginning of 2011 and sharply falling 
to a low of 9.3% at the end of 2012. Investment 




















Inter Bank Interest Rates were at a lowest of 
1.4% in the immediate post crisis period of 2010. 




















Liquidity in terms of total deposits fell to the 
lowest, at 66% of assets, during the crisis period, 
indicating the effect that it had on liquidity in the 
market. The post crisis period showed an increase 
in liquidity, hitting a highest of 76.9% during 
2010 and ending at 73% in 2012. 
 
 















Private sector lending increased steadily from a 
low of 29.5% in 2006 to a high of 47% during the 
crisis. This however dropped during the 
immediate post crisis period to 34%, before 












4.1.2 Macro-Economic Factors 
 
Figure 4: Macro-Economic Variables 
 



















The graph shows a sharp increase in the exchange 
rate during the crisis period, from a low of K3.20 
to a high of K5.60 to one dollar, within a few 
months. This only fell slightly during the post 





















Inflation increased sharply over the crisis period, 
from a low of 8.5% to a high of 16% at the peak 
of the crisis. This fell steadily during the post-
crisis period, to close at 7% in 2012. 
 
 




















The price of Copper was lowest during the crisis, 
from a high of US$ 9,000 to US$ 3,000 per tonne 
from the onset of the crisis, indicating the 




iv) CRISIS Dummy Variable 










The spike corresponds to the crisis period in 
Zambia - July 2008 to June 2009 
 
 





4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
  
The table below gives a summary of some descriptive statistics of the variables before (Pre-
Crisis), during (Crisis), and after (Post-Crisis) the crisis: 
 
Table 8: Variables - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Period 
Statistic 
 Mean  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev. 
  
1. 
Return on Assets  
(ROA - %) 
Pre-Crisis 5.0 6.8 4.0 0.7 
Crisis 3.5 4.6 2.1 0.8 
Post-Crisis 3.4 5.0 1.4 0.9 
2. 
Non-Performing Loans 
(NPLs - %) 
Pre-Crisis 3.4 4.3 2.4 0.6 
Crisis 3.8 5.1 2.7 0.9 
Post-Crisis 5.1 6.3 3.9 0.8 
3. 
Foreign Assets  
(FA - %) 
Pre-Crisis 14.4 21.0 10.1 2.2 
Crisis 13.9 16.2 11.2 1.5 
Post-Crisis 15.3 20.2 9.4 2.5 
4. 
Inter-Bank Lending  
Rates (IBLR - %) 
Pre-Crisis 10.7 20.6 5.4 3.2 
Crisis 11.9 16.0 8.2 2.0 
Post-Crisis 5.5 13.7 1.5 3.5 
5. 
Liquidity  
(LQD - %) 
Pre-Crisis 71.3 74.3 67.3 1.8 
Crisis 69.6 71.2 66.8 1.4 
Post-Crisis 73.9 76.9 70.7 1.8 
6. 
Credit to Private Sector 
(PRV - %) 
Pre-Crisis 35.2 41.6 29.5 3.8 
Crisis 44.8 47.1 42.0 1.8 
Post-Crisis 38.5 46.6 33.3 3.2 
7. 
Foreign Exchange Rate 
(FOREX – K/US$) 
Pre-Crisis 4.0 4.8 3.2 0.5 
Crisis 4.6 5.7 3.4 0.8 
Post-Crisis 4.9 5.3 4.5 0.2 
8. 
Inflation Rate  
(INFL - %) 
Pre-Crisis 12.3 19.5 7.9 4.1 
Crisis 14.5 16.6 12.6 1.2 
Post-Crisis 7.8 14.3 6.0 2.2 
9. 
Copper Prices  
(CU – US$) 
Pre-Crisis 5,770 8,840 2,933 1,857 
Crisis 4,546 7,665 2,953 1,544 
Post-Crisis 7,131 9,196 4,617 973 
 
The above table clearly shows that there is an evident change in each of the variables, as 
indicated by the means in the each of the periods before, during and after the crisis. This  
 





therefore suggests that the crisis may have had a measurable impact on the performance of the 
sector as a whole. 
 
Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) showed the largest adverse movement between the pre- and post- 
crisis periods, increasing by 52%. The Return on Assets (ROA) also showed an adverse 
movement, decreasing by 32% between the same periods. Other significant adverse movements 
can be seen in Copper Prices (CU), which fell by 21% in the period before and during the crisis, 
hitting a minimum of US$ 2,933 per tonne and maximum of US$ 8,840 during the same period. 
The post-crisis period, however showed a recovery in the copper prices, to an average of         
US$ 7,131 per tonne. 
 
Liquidity (LQD), as measured by total deposits, and Foreign Asset investments (FA), only fell 
slightly during the crisis, by 2% and 3% respectively, before increasing by 4% and 6% 
respectively, during the post crisis period. 
 
The Inter-Bank Lending Rates (IBLR) and Inflation (INFL), adversely increased by 11% and 
17% respectively during the pre- and crisis periods, before showing a favorable decrease of 48% 
and 36% respectively, during the post-crisis period. This significant decrease is presumably due 
to government’s efforts, in trying to stimulate economic activities by reducing inflation and 
interest rates. This is evidenced further by the increase in Private Sector lending (PRV), by 27% 
during the pre- and crisis periods, which is an important indicator for investment, and hence 
economic growth. 
 
The Foreign Exchange Rate (FOREX) increased from an average of K4.00 per US$ to K4.90 per 
US$, between the pre- and post- crisis periods, indicating a currency depreciation rate of 24% 










4.3 Econometric Modelling  
 
4.3.1 Stationarity Test 
 
As alluded to in the Methodology, stationarity of the time series data is critical if any meaningful 
conclusions are to be drawn from any estimated regression models of the variables. Although 
observation of the graphical time series data suggests that all the selected variables are non-
stationary, confirmatory results using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, to test for the 
presence or absence of Unit Roots, are shown in the Table 9. 
 
It is clear from Table 9 that the null hypothesis of no unit roots for all the variables are rejected at 
their first difference, as their probability values are less than 5%. Thus the variables are 
stationary and integrated of the same order I(1). The test, however, further reveals that the FA, 
IBLR and LQD variables are stationary, at both level and first difference. All other variables are 
non-stationary in their level form, and only become stationary after first differencing. 
 
The ADF results are generally in line with the graphical analysis, thus confirming that the 
variables are stationary and integrated of the same order I(1), and may be used for further 














No. of  
Lags 





Integration 1% 5% 10% 
1. 
Return on Assets  
(ROA) 
Level 
Constant 1 -2.466 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.127   
Trend + Const. 0 -3.696 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155 0.027 I(0) 
None 1 -1.127 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.235   
1st Diff. 
Constant 0 -12.887 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.000 I(1) 
Trend + Const. 0 -12.843 -4.059 -3.458 -3.155 0.000 I(1) 






Constant 1 -1.974 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.298   
Trend + Const. 1 -1.636 -4.059 -3.458 -3.155 0.771   
None 0 -0.094 -2.590 -1.944 -1.615 0.649   
1st Diff. 
Constant 0 -8.670 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.000 I(1) 
Trend + Const. 0 -8.738 -4.059 -3.458 -3.155 0.000 I(1) 
None 0 -8.697 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.000 I(1) 
3. 
Foreign Assets  
(FA) 
Level 
Constant 0 -3.514 -3.501 -2.892 -2.583 0.010 I(0) 
Trend + Const. 0 -3.591 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155 0.036 I(0) 
None 0 -1.289 -2.590 -1.944 -1.615 0.181   
1st Diff. 
Constant 0 -10.829 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.000 I(1) 
Trend + Const. 0 -10.769 -4.059 -3.458 -3.155 0.000 I(1) 
None 0 -10.835 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.000 I(1) 
4. 
Inter-Bank 
Lending Rates  
(IBLR) 
Level 
Constant 0 -3.180 -3.501 -2.892 -2.583 0.024 I(0) 
Trend + Const. 0 -3.467 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155 0.049 I(0) 
None 0 -1.567 -2.590 -1.944 -1.615 0.110   
1st Diff. 
Constant 1 -9.512 -3.502 -2.893 -2.584 0.000 I(1) 
Trend + Const. 1 -9.457 -4.060 -3.459 -3.155 0.000 I(1) 






Constant 0 -3.185 -3.501 -2.892 -2.583 0.024 I(0) 
Trend + Const. 0 -3.860 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155 0.018 I(0) 
None 0 -0.073 -2.590 -1.944 -1.615 0.656   
1st Diff. 
Constant 1 -9.162 -3.502 -2.893 -2.584 0.000 I(1) 
Trend + Const. 1 -9.133 -4.060 -3.459 -3.155 0.000 I(1) 
None 1 -9.212 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.000 I(1) 
 










No. of  
Lags 





Integration 1% 5% 10% 
6. 




Constant 0 -0.954 -3.501 -2.892 -2.583 0.767   
Trend + Const. 0 -1.584 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155 0.792   
None 0 0.572 -2.590 -1.944 -1.615 0.838   
1st Diff. 
Constant 0 -10.753 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.000 I(1) 
Trend + Const. 0 -10.623 -4.059 -3.458 -3.155 0.000 I(1) 
None 0 -10.628 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.000 I(1) 
7. 
Foreign 
Exchange Rate  
(FOREX) 
Level 
Constant 1 -1.773 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.392   
Trend + Const. 2 -3.472 -4.060 -3.459 -3.155 0.048 I(0) 
None 1 -0.055 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.662   
1st Diff. 
Constant 0 -6.650 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.000 I(1) 
Trend + Const. 0 -6.676 -4.059 -3.458 -3.155 0.000 I(1) 
None 0 -6.682 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.000 I(1) 
8. 
Inflation Rate  
(INFL) 
Level 
Constant 1 -2.280 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.181   
Trend + Const. 1 -2.372 -4.059 -3.458 -3.155 0.392   
None 1 -1.646 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.094   
1st Diff. 
Constant 0 -6.154 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.000 I(1) 
Trend + Const. 0 -6.188 -4.059 -3.458 -3.155 0.000 I(1) 
None 0 -6.093 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.000 I(1) 
9. 
Copper Prices  
(CU) 
Level 
Constant 0 -2.549 -3.501 -2.892 -2.583 0.107   
Trend + Const. 0 -2.601 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155 0.281   
None 0 -0.181 -2.590 -1.944 -1.615 0.618   
1st Diff. 
Constant 0 -11.579 -3.501 -2.893 -2.583 0.000 I(1) 
Trend + Const. 0 -11.587 -4.059 -3.458 -3.155 0.000 I(1) 
None 0 -11.600 -2.590 -1.944 -1.614 0.000 I(1) 
 
 





4.3.2 Cointegration Test 
 
Cointegration implies that the variables exhibit similar stochastic trends, and therefore have a 
long-run association. Testing for cointegration is a critical step, as it determines the appropriate 
regression model to apply. Using the Johansen’s co integration approach, the choice of the lag 
length, which is used in both the cointegration analysis and regression model, is determined 
using several information criteria, as shown in Table 10 below. Although there is no specified 
information criterion to apply, several literatures does suggest the use of the Schwarz (SC) and 
Akaike information criterion (AIC). It may however, be more prudent to take the most common 
lag amongst the various criteria, which in this case is a lag length of one (1) or alternatively, one 
that produces the best model in terms of diagnostic tests 
 
Table 10: Lag-order Selection Criterion 
Lag 
Criteria 
LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
  
0 -1068.161 NA  0.246 24.137 24.637 24.339 
1 -449.517 1086.063   1.61e-06* 12.189   14.939*   13.298* 
2 -393.119 87.731 0.000 12.736 17.736 14.752 
3 -335.170 78.553 0.000 13.248 20.498 16.172 
4 -226.769 125.263 0.000 12.639 22.139 16.470 
5 -126.352 95.954 0.000 12.208 23.957 16.946 
6 11.320   104.019* 0.000   10.948* 24.947 16.594 
 
The Johansen’s Cointegration Test derives two (2) likelihood estimators for ranking the 
number of cointegrating equations (CEs) in the model, the Trace and Maximum Eigen Value 












Table 11: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Tests 
Hypothesized  
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue 









None * 0.489 212.530 197.371 63.161 58.434 
At most 1 0.356 149.369 159.530 41.368 52.363 
At most 2 0.298 108.001 125.615 33.319 46.231 
At most 3 0.232 74.682 95.754 24.862 40.078 
At most 4 0.210 49.820 69.819 22.127 33.877 
At most 5 0.179 27.693 47.856 18.503 27.584 
At most 6 0.078 9.190 29.797 7.603 21.132 
At most 7 0.016 1.587 15.495 1.513 14.265 
At most 8 0.001 0.075 3.841 0.075 3.841 
Both the Trace and Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 0.05 level 
 
From the above table, results of both the Trace and Maximum Eigen Value Tests reject the null 
hypothesis of no CEs at the 5% level of significance, implying that the model has at most one (1) 
CE, with a lag length of one (1).  
 
Having established that the variables are cointegrated, we can proceed to estimate the Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM), which is the appropriate regression model. 
  
 





4.3.3 Estimating the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
 
The presence of cointegration between variables suggests that there is a long run association 
amongst the variables, indicating therefore that the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is 
the most appropriate regression model to apply. The main feature of the VECM is its ability to 
correct, through the error correction term, for any disequilibrium caused by shocks to the system, 
which may occur from time to time.  This makes it appropriate as it takes into account both the 
long and short run dynamics of the system. 
 
In estimating the VECM, the econometric software package Eviews is used. The software is 
ideal as it analyses data sets, interprets results, and draws conclusions in a user-friendly manner. 
The detailed  steps involved in estimating the VECM, using Eviews and  the  ‘Dummy’ variable 
(CRISIS), are given and illustrated by the Eviews screen-shots in Appendix 3. 
 
The system equation of the VECM, incorporating the error correction term, and accompanying 
table of coefficients, with corresponding t-statistic values, is given below (full outcome of the 































VECM System Equation: 
 
D(ROA) = C(1)*( ROA(-1) + 0.012*FA(-1) - 0.187*IBLR(-1) + 0.274*INFL(-1) - 3.056*LNCU(-1) - 
13.907*LNFOREX(-1) + 1.069*LQD(-1) + 0.756*NPL(-1) + 0.481*PRV(-1) - 56.903 ) + 
C(2)*D(ROA(-1)) + C(3)*D(FA(-1)) + C(4)*D(IBLR(-1)) + C(5)*D(INFL(-1)) + C(6)*D(LNCU(-1)) + 
C(7)*D(LNFOREX(-1)) + C(8)*D(LQD(-1)) + C(9)*D(NPL(-1)) + C(10)*D(PRV(-1)) + C(11) + 
C(12)*CRISIS 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     C(1) -0.084643 0.049748 -1.701416 0.0927 
C(2) -0.233334 0.103837 -2.247131 0.0273 
C(3) 0.018013 0.044486 0.404905 0.6866 
C(4) 0.038145 0.025500 1.495853 0.1385 
C(5) -0.146555 0.079333 -1.847334 0.0683 
C(6) -0.262512 0.540791 -0.485423 0.6287 
C(7) 0.385389 1.669766 0.230804 0.8180 
C(8) 0.116297 0.046284 2.512669 0.0139 
C(9) -0.168175 0.208422 -0.806900 0.4221 
C(10) -0.007262 0.048068 -0.151073 0.8803 
C(11) -0.016902 0.062037 -0.272443 0.7860 
C(12) -0.166314 0.184947 -0.899248 0.3712 
 
R-squared 0.253006     Mean dependent var -0.02318 
Adjusted R-squared 0.152799     S.D. dependent var 0.582565 
S.E. of regression 0.536214     Akaike info criterion 1.710176 
Sum squared resid 23.57706     Schwarz criterion 2.034851 
Log likelihood -68.3783     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.841321 
F-statistic 2.524845     Durbin-Watson stat 2.029269 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.008569    
 
The VECM table above indicates the coefficients, and their significance, at the 5% level of 
significance. The t-statistic and its associated probability (p-value), tests the hypothesis that the  
coefficient of the independent variable has a significant influence, or not, on the dependent 
variable, ROA. It therefore tests the hypothesis: 
 
𝐻0 : 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0, for no significant influence on the dependent variable, and 
𝐻1 : 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≠ 0, for a significant influence on the dependent variable. 
 
In this case a p-value of less 5% indicates that the independent variable is significant explaining 
the dependent variable. 
 





The coefficient C(1), for the error correction term [( ROA(-1) + 0.012*FA(-1) - 0.187*IBLR(-1) 
+ 0.274*INFL(-1) - 3.056*LNCU(-1) - 13.907*LNFOREX(-1) + 1.069*LQD(-1) + 
0.756*NPL(-1) + 0.481*PRV(-1) - 56.903 )] determines the speed of adjustment towards long 
run equilibrium. Any deviation from the long run equilibrium of the model is corrected by this 
error correction term, implying that the coefficient C(1) must be negative, and have a significant 
influence on the dependent variable ROA, for this to occur.  Although C(1) is negative (-
0.084643), which is desirable, its p-value is greater than 5% suggesting that it has no significant 
influence on the ROA. This implies that there is no long run influence on the dependent variable, 
ROA, from the selected independent variables. 
 
The table further indicates that of all the selected independent variables in the model, only the 
coefficient of the liquidity (LQD) variable was found to be significant, with a p-value of 1.39%. 
The coefficient therefore suggests that a 1% increase in the liquidity rate, as measured by the 
bank deposits to total asset ratio, results in an increase in the ROA, of about 0.12%. This is 
consistent with economic theory which, as already alluded to in the literature review, 
underscores the importance of bank deposits in liquidity creation and transformation, and hence 
its effect on the banking sector’s profitability, as measured by the ROA. 
 
With regards to the effect of the crisis on the ROA, the coefficient of the CRISIS dummy 
variable is negative, and the p-value greater than 5%, suggesting that although its effect was 
negative, it had very little influence on the sector’s profitability. This is generally consistent with 




The model is based on certain assumptions, therefore it is necessary to carry out diagnostic tests 
to assess its validity, and hence robustness of the model, in making inferences about the variables 
and their associations. From the VECM table above, the R-squared (Coefficient of  
 
 





determination), which indicates the proportion of the independent variables that influences the 
dependent variable ROA, is considered low at 0.25.  
 
The F-statistic, on the other-hand, appears to be significant with a p-value of less than 5%, which 
strengthens the validity of the model. The F Statistic is a measure of the joint significance of the 
independent variables, in the overall model, in influencing the dependent variable. This means 
that, although, the independent variables may individually be insignificant in influencing the 
dependent variable, jointly they are significant. 
 
The table below gives a summary of further key residual diagnostic checks, done on the       
model: 
 
Table 12: Residual Diagnostic Checks 
Test Test Statistic Prob. (P-Value) Decision 
 
i) Serial Correlation LM Test Obs*R-Square = 0.312 0.86 Do not reject 
ii) Heteroscedasticity Test Obs*R-Square = 18.051 0.52 Do not reject 
iii) Normality Test Jarque-Bera = 517.31 0.00 Reject 
 
i) Serial Correlation. May be referred to as autocorrelation, and measures the effect of the 
given time series variable with itself, over various time intervals. The test statistic is the 
observed R-squared which tests the null hypothesis for no serial correlation. From the 
above table the p-value is greater than 5%, therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
and conclude that there is no serial correlation in the model. This is a desirable feature of 
the model. 
 
ii) Heteroscedasticity. Refers to time series residual data with unequal variances over time. 
The test statistic is again, the observed R-squared which tests the null hypothesis for no 
heteroscedasticity. From the above table, the p-value is greater than 5% therefore we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is no heteroscedasticity in the 
model. This is a desirable feature of the model. 
 
 





iii) Normality. Refers to the feature of time series residual data being normally distributed. 
The test statistic is the Jarque-Bera , which tests the null hypothesis for normality. From 
the above table, the p-value is less than 5%, therefore we reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the residuals are not normally distributed. 
 
Following these diagnostic checks, it may be concluded that the model is sufficiently robust to be 
able to make meaningful inferences about the selected independent variables, and their 
association with the dependent variable, ROA. Although the model’s residuals are not normally 
distributed, other test features of the model, such as the absence of serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity are sufficient enough to validate it.  
  
 





4.3.4 Granger Causality Tests 
 
The Granger Causality Test, as already alluded to, goes further to establish the direction of the 
short-run causality, and not simply an association between variables. Estimation results for 
granger causality between the selected variables is summarized in Table 13 below (full results of 
the tests are detailed in Appendix 4): 
 
Table 13: Granger Causality Test Results - ROA as Dependent Variable 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
         
i)  LNFOREX does not Granger Cause ROA 4.32204 0.0404 Causality 
  ROA does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.55639 0.4576 No causality 
         
ii)  NPL does not Granger Cause ROA 3.70143 0.0575 No causality 
  ROA does not Granger Cause NPL 7.21212 0.0086 Causality 
         
iii)  PRV does not Granger Cause ROA 8.40946 0.0047 Causality 
  ROA does not Granger Cause PRV 0.02202 0.8824 No causality 
         
iv)  CRISIS does not Granger Cause ROA 4.45435 0.0375 Causality 
  ROA does not Granger Cause CRISIS 2.21393 0.1402 No causality 
         
v)  CRISIS does not Granger Cause LNCU 7.86918 0.0061 Causality 
  LNCU does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.37855 0.5399 No causality 
         
vi)  NPL does not Granger Cause FA 4.21477 0.0429 Causality 
  FA does not Granger Cause NPL 0.68362 0.4105 No causality 
         
vii)  PRV does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 6.22918 0.0143 Causality 
  LNFOREX does not Granger Cause PRV 1.65275 0.2018 No causality 
         
viii)  CRISIS does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 11.1343 0.0012 Causality 














Table 13: Granger Causality Test Results - ROA as Dependent Variable (Cont.) 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
         
ix)  INFL does not Granger Cause IBLR 4.07464 0.0464 Causality 
  IBLR does not Granger Cause INFL 0.10611 0.7454 No causality 
         
x)  LQD does not Granger Cause IBLR 2.5146 0.1162 No causality 
  IBLR does not Granger Cause LQD 4.35056 0.0398 Causality 
         
xi)  NPL does not Granger Cause IBLR 17.4787 7.00E-05 Causality 
  IBLR does not Granger Cause NPL 0.54016 0.4642 No causality 
         
xii)  PRV does not Granger Cause INFL 3.7871 0.0547 No causality 
  INFL does not Granger Cause PRV 4.01779 0.048 Causality 
         
xiii)  NPL does not Granger Cause LQD 6.03631 0.0159 Causality 
  LQD does not Granger Cause NPL 3.74002 0.0562 No causality 
         
xiv)  CRISIS does not Granger Cause NPL 5.71783 0.0188 Causality 
  NPL does not Granger Cause CRISIS 3.84423 0.0529 No causality 
 
From the above table, the following conclusions can be made about the direction of the short-run 
causality amongst the variables in the model: 
 
i) FOREX granger causes ROA, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning 
that in the short-run, movements in the foreign exchange rate has a significant effect on 
the banking sector’s profitability, ROA.  
 
ii) ROA granger causes NPL, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, movements in the sector’s profitability has a significant effect on the level 










iii) PRV granger causes ROA, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, lending to the private sector has a significant effect on the banking sector’s 
profitability, ROA. 
 
iv) CRISIS granger causes ROA unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that 
the CRISIS had a significant effect on the banking sector’s profitability, ROA. 
 
v) CRISIS granger causes LNCU unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning 
that the CRISIS had a significant effect on the Copper Prices. 
 
vi) NPL granger causes FA, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the level non-performing loans has a significant effect on the banking 
sector’s investment in foreign assets. 
 
vii) PRV granger causes LNFOREX, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning 
that in the short-run, lending to the private sector has a significant effect on the currency 
foreign exchange rate. 
 
viii) CRISIS granger causes LNFOREX unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, 
meaning that the CRISIS had a significant effect on the currency foreign exchange rate. 
 
ix) INFL granger causes IBLR, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that 
in the short-run, the rate of inflation has a significant effect on the banking sector’s inter-
bank lending rates. 
 
x) IBLR granger causes LQD, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that 
in the short-run, the banking sector’s inter-bank lending rates has a significant effect on 









xi) NPL granger causes IBLR, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the level of non-performing loans has a significant effect on the banking 
sector’s inter-bank lending rates. 
 
xii) INFL granger causes PRV, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the rate of inflation has a significant effect on the banking sector’s lending 
to the private sector. 
 
xiii) NPL granger causes LQD, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the level of non-performing loans has a significant effect on the sector’s 
liquidity in terms of level of deposits. 
 
xiv) CRISIS granger causes NPL unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that 
the CRISIS had a significant effect on the level of non-performing loans in the sector. 
 
Granger Causality with NPL Dependent Variable 
 
It is evident from the above VEC Model that, where the ROA is the dependent variable, NPLs 
have a significant short-run effect on a number of the selected independent variables (FA, IBLR 
and LQD). Re–running the VEC Model, using the NPL as the dependent variable therefore 
yields the following results for Granger Causality (Full results of the VECM and Granger 
Causality Tests are detailed in Appendix 5 & 6): 
 
Table 14: Granger Causality Test Results – NPL as Dependent Variable 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
         
i)  IBLR does not Granger Cause NPL 2.691 0.0366 Causality 
  NPL does not Granger Cause IBLR 6.49994 0.0001 Causality 
         
ii)  INFL does not Granger Cause NPL 2.62511 0.0403 Causality 
  NPL does not Granger Cause INFL 1.56808 0.1905 No causality 
 
 





Table 14: Granger Causality Test Results – NPL as Dependent Variable (Cont.) 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
         
iii)  LQD does not Granger Cause NPL 2.0347 0.097 No causality 
  NPL does not Granger Cause LQD 2.5636 0.0442 Causality 
         
iv)  PRV does not Granger Cause NPL 0.91175 0.4611 No causality 
  NPL does not Granger Cause PRV 4.55071 0.0023 Causality 
         
v)  LQD does not Granger Cause LNCU 1.96899 0.1068 No causality 
  LNCU does not Granger Cause LQD 7.13471 5.00E-05 Causality 
         
vi)  INFL does not Granger Cause IBLR 4.55001 0.0023 Causality 
  IBLR does not Granger Cause INFL 0.14294 0.9656 No causality 
 
i) IBLR granger causes NPL, and vice-versa, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the banking sector’s inter-bank lending rates have a significant effect on the 
level of non-performing loans, and vice-versa. 
 
ii) INFL granger causes NPL, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the rate of inflation has a significant effect on the level of non-performing 
loans. 
 
iii) NPL granger causes LQD, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the level of non-performing loans has a significant effect on the sector’s 
liquidity in terms of level of deposits. 
 
iv) NPL granger causes PRV, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the level of non-performing loans has a significant effect on the banking 
sector’s lending to the private sector. 
 
v) LNCU granger causes LQD, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the copper price has a significant effect on the sector’s liquidity in terms of 
level of deposits. 
 





vi) INFL granger causes IBLR, unidirectional, at the 5% level of significance, meaning that in 
the short-run, the rate of inflation has a significant effect on the banking sector’s inter-bank 
lending rates. 
 
With NPL as the dependent variable, the results clearly show that the banking sector’s inter-bank 
lending rates and the rate of inflation, both have a significant effect on the sector’s level of non-
performing loans (NPLs). 
  
 





4.4 Chapter Summary 
 
A monthly trend analysis of the selected variables over the 8-year period 2005-2012, covering 
the period before (Jan 2005 – Jun 2008), during (Jul 2008 – Jun 2009) and after (Jul 2009 – Dec 
2012) the crisis, clearly shows the adverse impact the crisis had on both the banking sector and 
macro-economic performance indicators. This is confirmed by the descriptive statistics clearly 
shows that there is an evident change in each of the variables, as indicated by the means in the 
each of the periods before, during and after the crisis.  
 
Although the monthly trend analysis suggests that all the selected variables are non-stationary, 
results using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, to test for the presence or absence of 
Unit Roots, confirm that the variables, after first differencing, are stationary and integrated of the 
same order I(1), and may be used for further analysis.  To determine the appropriate regression 
model to apply, the variables were tested for cointegration using the Johansen’s Cointegration 
Test, which revealed that they were cointegrated. This implies that there is a long run association 
between the variables, and the appropriate regression model is the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM). 
 
In estimating the system equation of the VECM, the econometric software package Eviews is 
used. The equation incorporates the error correction term which corrects any deviation from the 
long run equilibrium of the model. It further suggests that there is no long run influence on the 
dependent variable, ROA, from the selected independent variables. Of the independent variables, 
only the liquidity (LQD) variable was found to have a significant effect on the ROA. The crisis 
therefore had very little influence on the sector’s profitability. 
 
To establish the direction of the short-run causality between the variables, the Granger 
Causality Test was applied. From the results, the variables CRISIS, FOREX and PRV granger 
causes ROA, and NPLs granger causes FA, IBLR and LQD. Further, INFL and IBLR granger 






CHAPTER 5  
Conclusions & Recommendations 
5.1 Summary and Discussion  
 
Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the Zambian banking sector was characterized by low 
financial intermediation, with a large section of the population, having limited, or no access to 
affordable financial services. The high operational costs within the sector, as a comprehensive 
survey highlighted in 2004, has made banking services very costly, relative to the moderate 
lending and depository services offered. The relatively undeveloped financial markets also meant 
that investments in the sector were limited only to government securities, thus not only crowding 
out the private sector credit, but also making it more vulnerable to adverse changes in the 
financial markets. In addition, the weak coordination between government monetary and fiscal 
policy has further exacerbated the high service costs within the sector.  
 
Based on the literature review and analysis of data, over an eight (8) year period covering the 
periods before, during, and after the crisis, the chapter aims to draw conclusions and highlight 
the possible policy implications that would give policy decision makers, and regulators, with 
relevant tools to better understand the key factors that affect the performance, in terms of costs 
and profitability, of the Zambian banking sector, especially in times of global external shocks. 
 
Time series variables from selected sub-Saharan countries, with similar ownership structure as 
Zambia’s banking sector, were used to estimate a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) model to define 
the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. An exogenous ‘dummy’ 
variable was included in the model to simulate the effects of the crisis over the chosen time 
period. The profitability, as measured by the Return on Assets (ROA), and the level on Non-
Performing Loans (NPLs), were the dependent variables, and therefore, both used as measures of 
the performance of the sector. To establish the direction of the causality amongst the variables, 
whether uni or bidirectional, Granger Causality tests were further carried out on the variables  
 
 





The schematic figure below summaries the results of the relationships amongst the selected 
variables, and provides the basis for any policy recommendations. 
 





The above figure clearly shows that the crisis had a direct and significant effect on the four (4) 
variables;  
i) Profitability (ROA);  
ii) Level of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs);  
iii) Foreign exchange rate (LNFOREX); and  
iv) Price of Copper (LNCU).  
 
These results would suggest that during times of crisis, policy makers and regulators should 
focus their attention on these key variables, as they in turn have a direct and significant effect on 
the other identified variables within the banking system. If not properly managed therefore, the 
direct effects on these variables would potentially destabilize the whole banking system. 
 





Following the crisis, the policy stance of the government was to adopt a tighter monetary policy, 
focused mainly on stabilizing the foreign exchange rate. According to the BoZ Governor, the 
Central bank became a net seller of foreign exchange to banks, in an effort to dampen excessive 
volatility in the exchange rate (Fundanga, 2009). Other key measures adopted included 
tightening the supervisory guidelines and enhancing the information flows with the banks and 
major business entities. This was in an effort to better understand, and plan for, their expected 
foreign exchange requirements at any one time. 
 
5.2 Policy Implications  
 
As alluded to, the Monetary Policy was the main tool adopted by government to counter the 
effects of the crisis. From Figure 5 above, in addition to the direct effects of the crisis, the banks’ 
profitability (ROA) was directly influenced by the foreign exchange rate and the level of private 
sector lending. This would appear to support the move by the BoZ to focus on the stabilization of 
the foreign exchange rate during the crisis. Clearly the depreciation of the Kwacha by 24% 
during the wake of the crisis justifies the approach by government, which can be seen, from 
Figure 4, to bear fruit by its slight appreciation and stabilization in the few months into the crisis. 
The predominately foreign ownership structure of the sector may also explain the direct effect of 
the foreign exchange rate on the sectors’ profitability. 
 
Private sector lending has a direct influence on the foreign exchange rate as shown in Figure 5 
above. Therefore, the increase in private sector lending during the crisis was one way of 
countering the sharp depreciation of the kwacha, and supports the BoZ’s approach to 












With regards to the level of NPLs, these have a direct bearing on the lending to the private sector 
and as Figure 4 shows, were relatively stable prior to the crisis, but drastically increased during 
the crisis period. Clearly the NPLs were under direct pressure, not only from the effects of the 
crisis, but also the inflation and inter-bank interest rates, as evidenced from Figure 5 above.  
 
The effectiveness of monetary policy at the time may also have been questionable. The policy 
was more focused on influencing monetary aggregates, and hence liquidity, as a means of 
managing inflation. With hindsight, a monetary policy based on inflation targeting, may have 
been more effective in managing inflation, and hence the level of NPLs. Further, a lower 
inflation rate would favorably influence the inter-bank lending rates (IBLR), and in turn, the 
liquidity.  
 
While liquidity, as measured by deposits, fell sharply during the crisis, the fall could not directly 
be attributed to the crisis, as the Figure 5 clearly shows. It could however be indirectly attributed 
to the combined effect of the sharp fall in copper prices (CU); increased NPLs and inter-bank 
lending rates (IBLR), as evidenced from the trend analyses of each of the variables. Clearly any 
reduction in the level of NPLs, interest rates and inflation would have eased the pressure on the 
liquidity situation and allowed the banking system to perform its role of liquidity creation and 
transformation more cost efficiently.  
 
In addition, and although not included in the model, various literature has shown capital 
adequacy to be an important determinant of liquidity, with some suggesting a trade-off between 
the benefits of financial stability, through stronger capital requirements, and greater liquidity 
creation (Horváth, Seidler, & Weill, 2014). This is within the framework of the various BASEL 
accords and as earlier alluded to, at the time of the crisis, the Zambian banking sector was still 










only suggesting strong banking regulation and supervision, but also the possible influence of the 
predominately foreign owned banks within the sector, which may have contributed to the 
adoption of good governance and best international banking practices from their headquarter 
counterparts. 
 
5.3 Proposed Action Framework  
 
The proposed framework provides a basis that would aid policy decision-makers, and regulators, 
in addressing macroeconomic and bank performance challenges, in times of global external 
shocks. This is given in Figure 6 below: 
 











The framework suggests that to ensure stability of the Banking Sector during a crisis, the 
identified indicators need to be managed using both the Banking Sector Regulatory and 
Monetary Policy Instruments.  
 
Within the Banking sector, the critical indicators relate to Profitability (as measured by ROA); 
Assets Quality (as measured by NPLs); and Liquidity (as measured by deposit levels). During 
times of a crisis regulators may use the CAMEL (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management 
Efficiency, Earnings Ability, and Liquidity) Framework to ensure that the identified critical 
indicators are kept within certain limits. Application of the framework will also have an impact 
on the identified foreign exchange macro-economic indicator. 
 
The framework further indicates that the critical macro-economic indicator is the Foreign 
Exchange Rate. The appropriate Monetary Policy Instrument to use is the Central Bank’s Policy 
Rate, which sets the basis for interest rates in the sector. In addition, the Central Bank may 
influence the foreign exchange rate directly through its actions in buying and/or selling foreign 
currency on the market. This however should be done within certain limits as it may expose the 
sector and economy to other adverse effects. Like the banking regulatory instruments, 
application of the monetary policy instruments will also have an impact on the identified 
Banking Sector indicators. 
 
5.4 Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
Overall, the crisis had a limited impact on the sector’s profitability, but a more adverse effect on 
the asset quality, as measured by the level of NPLs. This had implications for both the sector and 
the economy as a whole. It is recommended therefore, that authorities initially focus their 










Firstly, regulation and supervision should engage in strong monitoring of banks’ credit appraisal 
processes and institute a more robust risk-management environment. This would help reduce 
credit and default risk, thereby lowering the levels of NPLs, and ensuring that liquidity in the 
sector is strengthened, with a high quality asset base.  
 
Secondly, the change in the monetary policy regime, from one which was anchored on a 
monetary aggregate measure during the crisis, to the current one, which anchors on a policy rate, 
gives the BoZ more leverage to influence liquidity through the inter-bank lending rate. This 
however, should not mean that it abandons the key principals of the old regime, but rather use it 
in tandem with the new one, especially in times of a crisis when liquidity is a challenge.  
 
Thirdly, efforts should be made on strengthening the cooperation between the BoZ, as the 
monetary authority, and the Government, through the Ministry of Finance, as the fiscal authority. 
This would further strengthen the broader liquidity framework, through a more coordinated debt 
management policy, which has implications for the cost efficiency of the banking sector, and 
hence the economy. 
 
Finally, much as the use of macro prudential policy and regulations are appropriate instruments 
in stabilizing and sustaining the sector, their excessive use may act as an entry barrier to 
competition, thereby limiting the number of players in the sector and making it more 
concentrated. As the sector is already predominantly owned by a few large and foreign banks, 
any such regulations may simply add to this level of concentration, and therefore, making it more 
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Belgolaise (Belgium)                         
Financial Bank (Benin)                         
Finabank (Botswana)                         
Afriland First (Cameroon)                         
FOTSO (Cameroon)                         
Cofipa (Côte d’Ivoire)                         
BNP Paribas (France)                         
Calyon (France)                         
SGB (France)                         
BGFI (Gabon)                         
First International (Gambia)                         
Novobanco (Germany)                         
Intl. Commercial (Ghana)                         
Kenya Commercial (Kenya)                         
BSIC (Libya)                         
Ecobank (Mali)                         
Capricorn I H (Namibia)                         
Guaranty Trust (Nigeria)                         
Intercontinental (Nigeria)                         
Millennium BCP (Portugal)                         
Bank of Africa (Togo)                         
Absa (South Africa)                         
Stanbic (South Africa)                         
Barclays (United Kingdom)                         
Stanchart (United Kingdom)                         
Citi (United States)                        
































































































































































Belgolaise (Belgium)                         
Financial Bank (Benin)                         
Finabank (Botswana)                         
Afriland First (Cameroon)                         
FOTSO (Cameroon)                         
Cofipa (Côte d’Ivoire)                         
BNP Paribas (France)                         
Calyon (France)                         
SGB (France)                         
BGFI (Gabon)                         
First International (Gambia)                         
Novobanco (Germany)                         
Intl. Commercial (Ghana)                         
Kenya Commercial (Kenya)                         
BSIC (Libya)                         
Ecobank (Mali)                         
Capricorn I H (Namibia)                         
Guaranty Trust (Nigeria)                         
Intercontinental (Nigeria)                         
Millennium BCP (Portugal)                         
Bank of Africa (Togo)                         
Absa (South Africa)                         
Stanbic (South Africa)                         
Barclays (United Kingdom)                         
Stanchart (United Kingdom)                         










NPL (%) FA (%) ROA (%) IBLR (%) LQD (%) PRV (%) 
FOREX 
(K/US$) 
INFL (%) CU (US$) 
Jan-05 2.96  20.98  6.80  14.30  73.05  36.59  4.79  18.20  3,008.55  
Feb-05 2.46  18.71  5.69  9.75  74.32  29.80  4.76  18.70  2,942.43  
Mar-05 2.36  16.61  5.18  8.62  73.88  30.19  4.71  17.40  3,023.36  
Apr-05 2.45  16.88  5.61  10.55  72.90  30.63  4.68  18.60  2,932.80  
May-05 2.40  16.36  4.77  10.75  72.15  31.15  4.69  19.10  2,955.83  
Jun-05 3.71  14.88  4.78  14.23  71.31  34.24  4.69  19.20  3,340.61  
Jul-05 3.71  14.50  4.86  17.46  70.61  32.09  4.62  18.70  3,331.12  
Aug-05 2.92  14.33  5.02  10.38  71.40  32.07  4.40  19.30  3,478.63  
Sep-05 3.18  13.17  5.31  17.76  72.33  32.62  4.44  19.50  3,422.18  
Oct-05 2.79  15.79  5.51  14.45  72.15  31.36  4.35  18.30  3,568.63  
Nov-05 2.81  15.36  5.54  13.83  71.07  29.95  4.03  17.20  3,938.24  
Dec-05 2.80  14.78  5.71  20.60  70.64  29.70  3.42  15.50  3,951.28  
Jan-06 2.86  14.39  6.39  10.03  71.19  29.52  3.36  12.20  4,187.24  
Feb-06 3.25  13.72  5.39  6.28  69.05  30.57  3.29  10.30  4,435.61  
Mar-06 3.50  11.93  5.20  7.74  69.71  31.64  3.29  10.70  5,079.94  
Apr-06 4.29  10.11  4.58  6.38  70.41  32.46  3.20  9.40  7,189.03  
May-06 4.25  11.16  5.11  6.90  69.66  32.90  3.18  8.60  7,608.70  
Jun-06 4.25  10.66  5.15  8.38  70.39  34.38  3.47  8.50  6,314.54  
Jul-06 4.27  10.46  5.21  6.88  73.72  35.61  3.55  8.70  7,070.32  
Aug-06 4.32  11.82  4.81  5.35  74.29  36.61  3.88  8.00  7,037.31  
Sep-06 3.89  13.33  4.60  7.92  71.59  33.82  4.05  8.20  6,731.02  
Oct-06 3.96  14.02  4.42  9.80  70.73  34.12  3.84  7.90  6,498.85  
Nov-06 4.01  15.49  4.34  7.24  71.79  33.52  3.98  8.10  5,996.55  
Dec-06 4.10  16.10  4.35  7.36  73.88  33.75  4.13  8.20  5,559.30  
 
  







NPL (%) FA (%) ROA (%) IBLR (%) LQD (%) PRV (%) 
FOREX 
(K/US$) 
INFL (%) CU (US$) 
Jan-07 3.81  14.40  6.75  8.43  73.32  36.03  4.22  9.80  4,235.81  
Feb-07 3.18  12.14  5.09  9.08  71.97  36.89  4.25  12.20  5,664.42  
Mar-07 3.00  11.90  4.76  10.18  68.66  37.69  4.26  12.70  6,847.29  
Apr-07 3.08  12.55  4.47  9.65  67.34  37.39  4.16  12.40  7,938.12  
May-07 3.23  13.20  4.36  12.50  72.45  37.34  4.01  11.80  7,241.22  
Jun-07 3.37  14.62  4.27  11.68  70.90  36.74  3.89  11.10  7,436.88  
Jul-07 3.16  13.71  4.20  10.45  73.66  37.02  3.83  11.20  8,147.52  
Aug-07 3.30  14.44  4.28  12.84  73.53  39.24  4.01  10.70  6,402.60  
Sep-07 3.30  14.79  4.25  14.03  72.03  39.52  3.96  9.30  8,066.24  
Oct-07 3.79  14.41  4.25  11.68  72.26  41.63  3.83  9.00  7,451.75  
Nov-07 3.62  16.08  4.19  11.26  69.16  39.49  3.77  8.70  6,815.35  
Dec-07 3.62  16.09  4.00  10.39  72.05  38.72  3.83  8.90  6,687.78  
Jan-08 3.28  16.74  5.10  10.42  70.68  39.21  3.80  9.30  7,082.52  
Feb-08 3.34  15.82  4.86  10.60  68.52  39.73  3.75  9.50  8,063.67  
Mar-08 3.59  13.84  4.82  10.98  68.77  40.76  3.67  9.80  7,095.46  
Apr-08 3.64  13.95  4.67  10.55  69.30  41.33  3.52  10.10  8,840.04  
May-08 3.13  16.10  4.81  10.68  69.25  40.96  3.40  10.90  6,934.10  
Jun-08 2.63  13.05  5.00  11.03  68.93  41.30  3.25  12.10  7,788.56  
Jul-08 2.67  14.55  4.63  11.85  68.71  41.97  3.39  12.60  7,665.00  
Aug-08 2.82  11.97  4.49  11.10  67.84  42.63  3.45  13.20  6,950.11  
Sep-08 3.13  11.23  4.37  11.73  66.82  43.34  3.54  14.20  5,915.01  
Oct-08 3.02  12.56  4.10  14.18  68.85  42.83  4.04  15.20  5,053.54  
Nov-08 3.42  12.57  3.83  15.98  71.24  45.07  4.26  15.30  3,733.09  
Dec-08 3.40  13.82  3.26  12.80  71.17  44.30  4.88  16.60  2,953.24  
 
  







NPL (%) FA (%) ROA (%) IBLR (%) LQD (%) PRV (%) 
FOREX 
(K/US$) 
INFL (%) CU (US$) 
Jan-09 3.56  14.62  3.56  9.51  70.10  45.59  5.02  16.00  3,178.87  
Feb-09 3.80  16.17  3.18  8.21  69.99  46.62  5.41  14.00  3,137.94  
Mar-09 4.44  14.33  3.21  11.42  70.14  47.11  5.58  13.10  3,519.74  
Apr-09 4.99  14.72  2.70  12.34  70.55  47.06  5.66  14.30  4,041.31  
May-09 4.98  15.22  2.36  11.97  69.38  45.68  5.19  14.70  4,208.39  
Jun-09 5.10  14.91  2.10  11.99  71.02  44.87  5.07  14.40  4,201.26  
Jul-09 5.34  15.25  1.83  11.89  71.05  43.97  5.13  14.00  4,617.04  
Aug-09 5.83  12.83  1.76  12.08  71.81  43.87  4.83  14.30  5,467.35  
Sep-09 6.14  14.07  1.38  11.78  70.72  41.59  4.65  13.00  5,234.57  
Oct-09 5.96  15.07  1.71  8.06  71.69  41.06  4.66  12.30  5,582.21  
Nov-09 5.68  13.81  1.74  5.11  71.50  39.52  4.66  11.50  6,203.48  
Dec-09 5.45  14.05  1.98  4.19  72.21  38.69  4.68  9.90  6,257.71  
Jan-10 5.64  12.08  5.00  4.41  71.74  38.40  4.51  9.40  6,587.67  
Feb-10 5.62  14.18  3.82  2.22  72.23  37.54  4.67  9.20  6,233.10  
Mar-10 6.32  14.27  4.10  1.70  71.85  36.05  4.70  10.00  6,932.23  
Apr-10 6.27  15.81  4.02  1.67  72.38  35.23  4.67  9.50  6,917.70  
May-10 6.21  15.14  3.52  1.55  73.12  36.47  4.97  8.90  6,494.98  
Jun-10 6.13  16.78  3.20  1.49  74.34  35.52  5.12  7.90  6,126.21  
Jul-10 5.89  17.03  3.06  1.49  73.58  33.30  5.02  7.90  6,591.53  
Aug-10 5.79  15.36  2.95  1.49  75.11  34.25  4.92  7.70  6,829.44  
Sep-10 6.29  15.38  2.90  1.49  76.75  35.03  4.87  7.80  7,359.37  
Oct-10 6.00  14.92  2.78  1.49  74.47  34.45  4.69  6.90  7,678.04  
Nov-10 6.16  14.85  2.88  1.49  74.45  35.32  4.70  6.60  8,374.50  
Dec-10 5.90  15.60  2.27  4.42  74.85  35.04  4.74  6.50  7,175.35  
 
  







NPL (%) FA (%) ROA (%) IBLR (%) LQD (%) PRV (%) 
FOREX 
(K/US$) 
INFL (%) CU (US$) 
Jan-11 5.66  20.20  3.66  2.07  76.92  34.93  4.77  6.30  8,134.67  
Feb-11 5.60  16.73  3.64  1.55  74.97  35.79  4.77  6.50  8,525.26  
Mar-11 5.39  16.02  3.49  2.57  71.59  36.48  4.76  6.60  9,196.08  
Apr-11 5.45  15.62  3.45  2.71  73.96  37.38  4.70  6.30  9,021.52  
May-11 5.27  16.20  3.35  3.50  74.10  36.79  4.75  6.30  7,540.82  
Jun-11 4.72  18.70  3.28  3.39  75.28  36.24  4.81  6.10  8,400.22  
Jul-11 4.51  18.54  3.21  4.05  76.65  37.18  4.83  6.90  8,648.49  
Aug-11 4.28  18.04  3.29  4.59  74.40  36.85  4.93  6.50  7,319.66  
Sep-11 4.33  17.04  3.34  8.76  75.92  37.84  4.92  6.60  7,096.08  
Oct-11 4.14  17.07  3.82  13.67  76.39  38.18  4.95  6.70  7,749.57  
Nov-11 4.02  17.11  4.21  6.86  74.21  38.96  5.03  6.40  7,398.35  
Dec-11 4.48  16.83  3.38  8.76  75.55  39.71  5.12  6.00  7,500.88  
Jan-12 4.50  16.80  4.52  6.01  75.99  39.61  5.13  6.42  7,297.75  
Feb-12 4.57  17.52  4.43  5.72  76.47  39.15  5.22  5.99  7,641.83  
Mar-12 4.33  17.44  4.03  5.98  75.95  39.20  5.28  6.41  7,672.01  
Apr-12 4.10  18.77  4.09  8.31  75.42  38.60  5.24  6.50  7,493.89  
May-12 4.26  17.29  4.05  7.72  74.16  38.87  5.21  6.59  7,226.73  
Jun-12 4.36  14.06  4.15  8.06  74.46  40.37  5.25  6.67  7,166.01  
Jul-12 4.33  13.93  4.28  9.11  73.96  40.95  4.86  6.19  6,832.02  
Aug-12 4.29  10.79  4.16  7.62  73.35  40.93  4.91  6.44  6,830.56  
Sep-12 4.27  10.97  4.11  7.58  71.79  40.99  5.03  6.59  7,727.62  
Oct-12 4.03  10.24  3.97  8.45  73.08  45.13  5.17  6.85  6,686.60  
Nov-12 4.09  9.35  3.78  8.99  72.33  46.55  5.20  6.93  7,110.94  






APPENDIX 3: Steps in Estimating the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
 
STEP 1. Open variables as group which includes the dummy variable (CRISIS).  
 
Note that the Dummy varible is zero (0) for the entire period, except during the period of the crisis which is set at one (1). The one(1) 
and zero(0) therefore indicates the presence (1) or absence (0) of the Crisis.   
































STEP 2 (Cont.)  
 
Table indicates at most one (1) co-integrated equation at the 5% level indicating that the variables are co-integrated, and therefore 
have a long-run association. 
 









































STEP 3 (Cont.) 
 
 














This is the full VECM showing the coefficients of the cointegrating equation and the error correction model with a lag 1. 
 




STEP 4. The model gives the coefficient, standard error, and the T statistic value only, but not the p-value of the variables, which is a 








































STEP 4 (Cont.) 
 







APPENDIX 4: Granger Causality Test Results – ROA as Dependent Variable 
 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
        
 LNCU does not Granger Cause ROA 0.24848 0.6193 No causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause LNCU 0.12992 0.7193 No causality 
        
 FA does not Granger Cause ROA 0.10436 0.7474 No causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause FA 3.78188 0.0549 No causality 
        
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause ROA 4.32204 0.0404 Causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.55639 0.4576 No causality 
        
 IBLR does not Granger Cause ROA 0.65885 0.4191 No causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.6973 0.4059 No causality 
        
 INFL does not Granger Cause ROA 0.10706 0.7443 No causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause INFL 2.29337 0.1334 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause ROA 0.27878 0.5988 No causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause LQD 3.26437 0.0741 No causality 
        
 NPL does not Granger Cause ROA 3.70143 0.0575 No causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause NPL 7.21212 0.0086 Causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause ROA 8.40946 0.0047 Causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause PRV 0.02202 0.8824 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause ROA 4.45435 0.0375 Causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause CRISIS 2.21393 0.1402 No causality 
        
 FA does not Granger Cause LNCU 0.10427 0.7475 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause FA 1.1342 0.2897 No causality 
        
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause LNCU 0.24346 0.6229 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.37332 0.5427 No causality 
        
 IBLR does not Granger Cause LNCU 3.09037 0.0821 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.442 0.5078 No causality 
 





Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
 INFL does not Granger Cause LNCU 7.90461 0.006 Causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause INFL 0.24417 0.6224 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause LNCU 0.91901 0.3402 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause LQD 1.72572 0.1922 No causality 
        
 NPL does not Granger Cause LNCU 2.50022 0.1173 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause NPL 2.32508 0.1307 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause LNCU 0.88553 0.3492 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause PRV 3.0655 0.0833 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause LNCU 7.86918 0.0061 Causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.37855 0.5399 No causality 
        
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause FA 1.6107 0.2076 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 3.15351 0.0791 No causality 
        
 IBLR does not Granger Cause FA 0.4543 0.502 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.34383 0.5591 No causality 
        
 INFL does not Granger Cause FA 0.40449 0.5264 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause INFL 0.10978 0.7411 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause FA 3.74987 0.0559 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause LQD 0.8924 0.3473 No causality 
        
 NPL does not Granger Cause FA 4.21477 0.0429 Causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause NPL 0.68362 0.4105 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause FA 0.07435 0.7857 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause PRV 2.63745 0.1078 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause FA 0.00112 0.9734 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.84016 0.3617 No causality 
        
 IBLR does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 2.98812 0.0872 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.05046 0.8228 No causality 
 





Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
 INFL does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 1.95881 0.165 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause INFL 0.00489 0.9444 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.19825 0.6572 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause LQD 3.42656 0.0674 No causality 
        
 NPL does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.68132 0.4113 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause NPL 0.59038 0.4442 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 6.22918 0.0143 Causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause PRV 1.65275 0.2018 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 11.1343 0.0012 Causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause CRISIS 4.0305 0.0476 No causality 
        
 INFL does not Granger Cause IBLR 4.07464 0.0464 Causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause INFL 0.10611 0.7454 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause IBLR 2.5146 0.1162 No causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause LQD 4.35056 0.0398 Causality 
        
 NPL does not Granger Cause IBLR 17.4787 7.00E-05 Causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause NPL 0.54016 0.4642 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.27058 0.6042 No causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause PRV 0.64325 0.4246 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause IBLR 1.23226 0.2699 No causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.25737 0.6131 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause INFL 1.27989 0.2609 No causality 
 INFL does not Granger Cause LQD 3.72744 0.0566 No causality 
        
 NPL does not Granger Cause INFL 3.78849 0.0547 No causality 










Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
 PRV does not Granger Cause INFL 3.7871 0.0547 No causality 
 INFL does not Granger Cause PRV 4.01779 0.048 Causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause INFL 3.34564 0.0706 No causality 
 INFL does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.15382 0.6958 No causality 
        
 NPL does not Granger Cause LQD 6.03631 0.0159 Causality 
 LQD does not Granger Cause NPL 3.74002 0.0562 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause LQD 0.3967 0.5304 No causality 
 LQD does not Granger Cause PRV 0.37679 0.5408 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause LQD 0.85261 0.3582 No causality 
 LQD does not Granger Cause CRISIS 3.01062 0.0861 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause NPL 0.9239 0.339 No causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause PRV 2.97708 0.0878 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause NPL 5.71783 0.0188 Causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause CRISIS 3.84423 0.0529 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause PRV 0.9256 0.3385 No causality 







APPENDIX 5: VEC Model - NPL as Dependent Variable 
 




LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
  
0 -614.4108 NA  8.79E-06 13.89914   14.39579* 14.09951* 
1 -532.2019 144.5432   8.65e-06*   13.87257* 16.60416 14.9746 
2 -487.413 69.89032 2.03E-05 14.66842 19.63495 16.67211 
3 -409.0383 106.7963 2.47E-05 14.72612 21.92759 17.63146 
4 -305.5078   120.5959* 2.00E-05 14.23094 23.66736 18.03795 
 
 
VECM System Equation: 
 
D(NPL) = C(1)*( NPL(-1) + 0.184405161341*FA(-1) + 0.189771647236*IBLR(-1) - 
0.0210882689889*INFL(-1) - 0.00447765678212*LNCU(-1) + 3.59149362775*LNFOREX(-1) - 
0.313363480115*LQD(-1) -0.019881687002*PRV(-1) + 0.645453886093*ROA(-1) 
+7.15267456178 ) + C(2)*D(NPL(-1)) + C(3)*D(NPL(-2)) + C(4)*D(NPL(-3)) + C(5)*D(NPL(-4)) 
+ C(6)*D(FA(-1)) + C(7)*D(FA(-2)) + C(8)*D(FA(-3)) + C(9)*D(FA(-4)) + C(10)*D(IBLR(-1)) + 
C(11)*D(IBLR(-2)) + C(12) *D(IBLR(-3)) + C(13)*D(IBLR(-4)) + C(14)*D(INFL(-1)) + 
C(15)*D(INFL(-2)) + C(16)*D(INFL(-3)) + C(17)*D(INFL(-4)) + C(18)*D(LNCU(-1)) + 
C(19)*D(LNCU(-2)) + C(20)*D(LNCU(-3)) + C(21)*D(LNCU(-4)) + C(22)*D(LNFOREX(-1)) + 
C(23)*D(LNFOREX(-2)) + C(24)*D(LNFOREX(-3)) + C(25)*D(LNFOREX(-4)) + 
C(26)*D(LQD(-1)) + C(27)*D(LQD(-2)) +       C(28)*D(LQD(-3)) + C(29)*D(LQD(-4)) + 
C(30)*D(PRV(-1)) + C(31)*D(PRV(-2)) + C(32)*D(PRV(-3)) + C(33)*D(PRV(-4)) + 
C(34)*D(ROA(-1)) + C(35)*D(ROA(-2)) + C(36)*D(ROA(-3)) + C(37)*D(ROA(-4)) + C(38) + 
C(39)*CRISIS 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
C(1) -0.0257 0.095291 -0.269651 0.7885 
C(2) 0.111698 0.17714 0.630561 0.5311 
C(3) 0.050617 0.146599 0.345279 0.7313 
C(4) -0.25116 0.160277 -1.567044 0.1232 
C(5) 0.093928 0.154736 0.607022 0.5465 
C(6) 0.032811 0.031011 1.058035 0.2949 
C(7) 0.022506 0.028706 0.784036 0.4366 
C(8) -0.05152 0.027919 -1.845482 0.0707 
C(9) -0.02922 0.024966 -1.170215 0.2472 
C(10) -0.02218 0.020292 -1.092946 0.2795 
C(11) 0.008832 0.019674 0.448914 0.6554 




C(12) -0.00874 0.018129 -0.481964 0.6319 
C(13) 0.003013 0.016951 0.177769 0.8596 
C(14) -0.04027 0.050704 -0.794223 0.4307 
C(15) 0.027746 0.055958 0.495842 0.6221 
C(16) -0.13634 0.051088 -2.668736 0.0101 
C(17) 0.064986 0.05628 1.154698 0.2535 
C(18) 0.559242 0.334565 1.67155 0.1006 
C(19) 0.079985 0.325917 0.245416 0.8071 
C(20) 0.348641 0.32732 1.065138 0.2917 
C(21) -0.53106 0.377668 -1.406155 0.1656 
C(22) 0.783796 1.078734 0.726589 0.4707 
C(23) -0.46888 1.09693 -0.427451 0.6708 
C(24) 1.384246 1.039431 1.331735 0.1888 
C(25) -0.18498 1.011812 -0.182823 0.8556 
C(26) -0.03576 0.03508 -1.019378 0.3127 
C(27) -0.0611 0.031612 -1.932909 0.0587 
C(28) 0.00686 0.031279 0.21931 0.8273 
C(29) 0.001616 0.025877 0.06244 0.9505 
C(30) 0.04977 0.040837 1.218744 0.2284 
C(31) -0.06333 0.040418 -1.566818 0.1232 
C(32) -0.04718 0.04589 -1.028024 0.3087 
C(33) -0.06436 0.035698 -1.802816 0.0772 
C(34) -0.05167 0.077282 -0.668643 0.5067 
C(35) 0.001011 0.079217 0.012759 0.9899 
C(36) 0.006952 0.074287 0.093582 0.9258 
C(37) -0.14398 0.064156 -2.244184 0.0291 
C(38) -0.03391 0.036851 -0.920253 0.3617 
C(39)   0.26311 0.116846   2.251769 0.0286 
 
R-squared 0.591146     Mean dependent var 0.016896 
Adjusted R-squared 0.292368     S.D. dependent var 0.315156 
S.E. of regression 0.265112     Akaike info criterion 0.480197 
Sum squared resid 3.654782     Schwarz criterion 1.556279 
Log likelihood 17.15105     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.914329 
F-statistic 1.978545     Durbin-Watson stat 1.918539 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.011238 










Residual Diagnostic Checks 
 
Test Test Statistic Prob. (P-Value) Decision 
 
i) Serial Correlation LM Test Obs*R-Square = 8.621 0.07 Do not reject 
ii) Heteroscedasticity Test Obs*R-Square = 54.107 0.19 Do not reject 







APPENDIX 6: Granger Causality Test Results - NPL as Dependent Variable 
 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
        
 LNCU does not Granger Cause NPL 2.1567 0.081 No causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause LNCU 1.62726 0.1751 No causality 
        
 FA does not Granger Cause NPL 0.1622 0.9569 No causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause FA 1.19824 0.3178 No causality 
        
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause NPL 0.45306 0.7699 No causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.95596 0.4362 No causality 
        
 IBLR does not Granger Cause NPL 2.691 0.0366 Causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause IBLR 6.49994 0.0001 Causality 
        
 INFL does not Granger Cause NPL 2.62511 0.0403 Causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause INFL 1.56808 0.1905 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause NPL 2.0347 0.097 No causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause LQD 2.5636 0.0442 Causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause NPL 0.91175 0.4611 No causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause PRV 4.55071 0.0023 Causality 
        
 ROA does not Granger Cause NPL 2.12999 0.0843 No causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause ROA 0.64876 0.6293 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause NPL 2.37221 0.0589 No causality 
 NPL does not Granger Cause CRISIS 1.05716 0.383 No causality 
        
 FA does not Granger Cause LNCU 1.03707 0.3931 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause FA 0.35925 0.8369 No causality 
        
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause LNCU 0.82657 0.512 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 1.89621 0.1188 No causality 
        
 IBLR does not Granger Cause LNCU 2.68091 0.0371 Causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.14176 0.9661 No causality 
 




Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
 INFL does not Granger Cause LNCU 3.74604 0.0075 Causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause INFL 1.3082 0.2737 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause LNCU 1.96899 0.1068 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause LQD 7.13471 5.00E-05 Causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause LNCU 0.32676 0.8593 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause PRV 1.59578 0.1831 No causality 
        
 ROA does not Granger Cause LNCU 1.78476 0.1396 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause ROA 0.26544 0.8994 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause LNCU 2.25098 0.0705 No causality 
 LNCU does not Granger Cause CRISIS 1.15887 0.335 No causality 
        
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause FA 0.71796 0.582 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.25917 0.9033 No causality 
        
 IBLR does not Granger Cause FA 1.68148 0.162 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.50711 0.7306 No causality 
        
 INFL does not Granger Cause FA 0.16459 0.9557 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause INFL 0.51027 0.7283 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause FA 1.73862 0.1492 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause LQD 1.30539 0.2748 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause FA 0.27659 0.8923 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause PRV 0.07473 0.9897 No causality 
        
 ROA does not Granger Cause FA 0.98165 0.4222 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause ROA 0.47213 0.756 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause FA 0.32677 0.8593 No causality 
 FA does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.6661 0.6173 No causality 
        
 IBLR does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.72113 0.5799 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.6685 0.6157 No causality 
 
 




Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
 INFL does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.8874 0.4753 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause INFL 1.49961 0.2098 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 0.47154 0.7565 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause LQD 0.78049 0.541 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 1.93999 0.1114 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause PRV 1.83224 0.1304 No causality 
        
 ROA does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 1.19353 0.3198 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause ROA 0.98126 0.4224 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause LNFOREX 1.08882 0.3675 No causality 
 LNFOREX does not Granger Cause CRISIS 2.03639 0.0967 No causality 
        
 INFL does not Granger Cause IBLR 4.55001 0.0023 Causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause INFL 0.14294 0.9656 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.86506 0.4885 No causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause LQD 1.84304 0.1283 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause IBLR 1.95895 0.1084 No causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause PRV 0.09485 0.9838 No causality 
        
 ROA does not Granger Cause IBLR 1.34768 0.2593 No causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause ROA 0.86572 0.4881 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause IBLR 0.92887 0.4513 No causality 
 IBLR does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.13998 0.9669 No causality 
        
 LQD does not Granger Cause INFL 1.57469 0.1887 No causality 
 INFL does not Granger Cause LQD 1.06153 0.3808 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause INFL 0.91495 0.4593 No causality 
 INFL does not Granger Cause PRV 0.98835 0.4186 No causality 
        
 ROA does not Granger Cause INFL 1.39993 0.2412 No causality 
 INFL does not Granger Cause ROA 0.85892 0.4922 No causality 
 
 




Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  Conclusion 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause INFL 1.43222 0.2306 No causality 
 INFL does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.82879 0.5106 No causality 
        
 PRV does not Granger Cause LQD 1.40074 0.2409 No causality 
 LQD does not Granger Cause PRV 1.06964 0.3768 No causality 
        
 ROA does not Granger Cause LQD 2.18261 0.078 No causality 
 LQD does not Granger Cause ROA 1.16869 0.3306 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause LQD 0.37834 0.8235 No causality 
 LQD does not Granger Cause CRISIS 1.06153 0.3808 No causality 
        
 ROA does not Granger Cause PRV 1.24888 0.2968 No causality 
 PRV does not Granger Cause ROA 2.24598 0.071 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause PRV 0.79873 0.5294 No causality 
 PRV does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.48915 0.7437 No causality 
        
 CRISIS does not Granger Cause ROA 2.42496 0.0544 No causality 
 ROA does not Granger Cause CRISIS 0.43628 0.782 No causality 
 
